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In 1996, the Aspen Institute Berlin and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published Unfinished
Peace, the report of the International Commission on the Balkans which had been established at the initiative and
with the support of European and American foundations in 1995. In his foreword to the report, former Prime
Minister of Belgium Leo Tindemans, who served as Chairman of the Commission, stated that the objective of the
Commission Members was "peace, a durable one, to pave the way to democracy, prosperity, well-being and a
humane society". Dayton, which had been signed in November 1995, was only the point of departure as it "marked
the end of the war, but only the beginning of the peace". The task for the international community at that point
was to "help transform the proverbially chaotic, bloody and unpredictable Balkans of the past into a stable, peace-
ful and dependable Southeastern Europe of the future".
Two years before the establishment of the Commission, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had
republished the results of its 1913 Inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 (The
Other Balkan Wars, 1993), the first International Commission on the Balkans presided over by the French Senator
Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. Reports of atrocities occurring in the Balkans had prompted Nicholas Murray
Butler, one of the Endowment's leaders and president of Columbia University to send a commission of six individu-
als for "an impartial and exhaustive examination" of the hostilities in the Balkans. It was much in the same spirit that
the second Commission was created under the impression of the violent break-up of former Yugoslavia and the
ferocity of the wars. 
During its visits to the Balkan states during the second half of 1995 and the first half of 1996, the Commission
was struck by the parallels between their impressions and the insights of the first Carnegie Commission of 1913/1914
as its haunting question was still pertinent: "Must we allow these Balkan wars to pass, without at least trying to
draw some lessons from them, without knowing whether they have been a benefit or an evil, if they should begin
again tomorrow and go on for ever extending?" The second Commission's report concludes "that turning a blind
eye on the Balkans is no less a recipe for disaster at the end of the twentieth century than it was at its outset."
In the difficult context of the mid-nineties and the muddle of international efforts directed at the Balkans,
Unfinished Peace was a remarkable document analyzing the causes of instability and conflict, assessing internation-
al responses and the lessons to be drawn, and suggesting a process and a framework for defusing and overcoming
the conflicts in a broader regional context. We commend Leo Tindemans, Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremek, Lord
Roper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil and the late David Anderson for raising their voice in the cacophony of the time
and offering their far-sighted analysis when the international community was still approaching the Balkans with a
piecemeal approach. Unfortunately, the Commission's warnings were largely left unheard, and the international
community had to undergo another painful lesson with the war in Kosovo and a more successful short-term con-
flict resolution in Macedonia before a more stable peace could be established. 
Today, almost a century after the creation of the first International Commission on the Balkans, a third
Commission on the Balkans is publishing its report. Different from the first two, this report is the first that is able
to reach beyond war and peace. Almost ten years after the Dayton agreement, and almost five years after the fall
of the Milosevic regime, the Western Balkans are a relatively stable region, the danger of war is no longer immi-
nent, and the countries of the region have proven stable enough not to be thrown into chaos by political turmoil.
Moreover, the European Union committed itself to integrating the countries of the region at the Thessaloniki
Summit in June 2003. Why then, the reader might ask, do we need a third International Commission on the
Balkans? 
Despite the achievements to date, the stability of the region still rests on weak feet. Reform processes are hin-
dered by the legacy of the past: immense structural challenges, constitutional problems, open status issues, a dire
economic situation and political instability. Unprecedented amounts of reconstruction and development aid poured
into the region could not lead to the desired results because of the chronic political instability and doubts about
the future. How fragile even the peace is in some parts of the region was demonstrated by the violence which erupt-
ed in Kosovo in March 2004 - and the helpless response of the international community. Preserving the current sta-
tus quo will not suffice to achieve lasting peace and stability, economic prosperity and to pave the way for European
integration. Additional efforts and a shift in international and Brussels thinking in particular are required in order to
solve outstanding issues and accelerate the transition process. 
In order to induce these developments with new momentum, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the King Baudouin
Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation in a concerted
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transatlantic effort of private foundations decided to establish a new independent International Commission on the
Balkans. We thank them for their inspiration and continuous support of our endeavor. Our task was to present
results which will stir the debate on the future of the region and to ultimately develop a vision for the integration
of the countries of Southeast Europe into the European Union.
The composition of our Commission reflected the changed situation in the Western Balkans and the different qual-
ity of cooperation that should guide the relations between the so-called "international community" and the region. It
was a great pleasure and enrichment for me to work with 18 distinguished individuals both from the region and from
outside the region who assembled such an array of expertise in matters Balkan, European and Transatlantic. In trying to
understand the current situation in the countries of the Western Balkans, we relied on the analyses of experts who are
familiar with the changing nature of challenges facing the region. We are especially grateful to James O'Brien, Srdjan
Bogosavljevic, Jovan Teokarevic, Srdjan Darmanovic, Gerald Knaus, Stevo Pendarovski, Remzi Lani, Antonina Zheliazkova,
Damir Grubisa and Josip Kregar whose contributions helped shape our opinions. Our intellectual and practical journeys
through the region were prepared and guided by a conscientious and highly motivated staff.
Over the course of one year, we undertook four Study Tours to the countries of the Western Balkans which gave
us the opportunity to exchange views with many individuals whose time is gratefully acknowledged. Unlike our
predecessors, we did not have to face the immediate suffering and destruction caused by war. However, in many
parts of the Balkans, the smell of violence is still in the air, and the distrust and hopelessness of people in view of
the insecurity and dire economic and social situation is depressing. We left enclaves in Kosovo with the conviction
that they will stand out as shameful symbols of the failure of international policy if the international community will
not succeed in securing the basic rights of these people and establishing conditions for a better life.
During all of our visits, whether in Belgrade, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje, Tetovo, Tirana or
Zagreb, the most memorable encounters were those with the youth and students, impressive young individuals
who are trying to shape their future against bleak economic prospects in societies which have only begun to come
to terms with their past. All of them see the future of their countries within the European Union. Understandably,
most of them envisage their own immediate future abroad even though they are very attached to their homelands.
We regard our recommendations as reaching out to these generations of potential leaders who are the future of
the region and its hope for reconciliation. If the international community does not remedy the damage that some
of its policies have done, we will see these young people leaving their countries in search of a better life.
Many will argue that the governments and the citizens of the region are responsible for the future of their own
societies, and should bring their own houses in order. In view of the political and financial engagement since the
beginning of the nineties and the responsibility the international community has assumed, such arguments are
nothing short of cynical. 
We do not cherish any illusions about the current political will among the member states of the European Union
to make major new commitments. Enlargement fatigue hovers over the European capitals these days, the looming
referenda on the European constitution question the future of the European project. In the absence of headline-
grabbing violence, many European politicians and civil servants hold on to the hope that the status quo is working
just fine. However, if the reform and transition process fails, the Western Balkans will become even more of an iso-
lated ghetto, and loom as a threat to stability and peace. The international community and the European Union in
particular have been engaged in the Balkans to an extent which is unprecedented so far, and should see this
engagement to a successful end. It will take more than symbolic gestures and rhetoric to build the pro-European
constituencies in the Balkans who will translate their dreams into votes for political elites to carry forward the reform
processes. And it will take no less of an effort to communicate the Balkans as a future part of the European Union
and the sense of urgency to the public in European Union member states.
If the EU chooses success over failure in the Balkans, the next two years could see the beginning of a long-term
solution to the problems that would enable all parties to close the book on the Balkans' bloody twentieth century
and to win the peace which has been established at such high human and financial cost. It would also mean that
this was the last International Commission on the Balkans which had to be initiated.
Giuliano Amato
Chairman of the International Commission on the Balkans
April 2005
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1 Timothy Garton Ash, Bosnia in Europe's Future, New York Review of Books, December 21, 1995.
It was in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 that Europe entered the century of madness and self-de-
struction. The founding fathers of the European Union, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, were
respectively 28 and 26 years old. But their dream of a united Europe, founded on shared values
and institutionalised interdependence, can easily be traced back to that summer day in Sarajevo.
Eighty years later, in the early days of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, a photo of a
half-ruined post office with three items of graffiti written on its wall captured the imagination of
the world. The first graffito read "This is Serbia!"; the second stated "This is Bosnia". And someone
scrawled underneath, "No, you idiots, it's a post office!" But a European historian of the present
added a line of his own, "This is Europe"1. Because all of the destruction in the Yugoslav wars has
been done by Europeans to other Europeans in Europe. The line "This is Europe" embodies the
European Union's moral imperative when it comes to overcoming the legacies of war and destruc-
tion in the Balkans. There is also a security imperative. Political instability in the Balkans threatens
Europe with the prospects of never ending military conflicts, constant flows of immigrants, flour-
ishing of Balkan-based criminal networks and the erosion of the EU's credibility in the world. 
It is in Sarajevo in the summer of 2014 that Europe should demonstrate that a new European
century has arrived.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade after the Dayton Agreement, and almost five years
after the fall of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, the Western Balkans2
are a relatively stable region with no military conflicts, no ongoing eth-
nic cleansing, where elections are free, if not always fair. In Thessaloniki
in June 2003, the European Union committed itself to integrating the
countries from the region. But what does this commitment really mean?
The region is as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the
wars are over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The
region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states and international pro-
tectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable
forces. Economic growth in these territories is low or non-existent;
unemployment is high; corruption is pervasive; and the public is pes-
simistic and distrustful towards its nascent democratic institutions. 
The international community has invested enormous sums of money,
goodwill and human resources here. It has put 25 times more money and
50 times more troops on a per capita basis in post-conflict Kosovo than in
2 Since it first came into use at the turn of the 19th century, the Balkans have always been a fluid concept with countries being excluded and included
regularly and not always for any discernible reason. The past fifteen years have seen the region go through more contortions of geographic definition.
For the Commission's report, we have reduced the Balkans to include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.
Where we also wish to include Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria or any combination of the three, we have stated so explicitly. As we were working on this
report, we had good reason to believe that Croatia was preparing to open negotiations with the European Union on the conditions for its accession.
post-conflict Afghanistan. But despite the scale of the assistance effort
in the Balkans, the international community has failed to offer a con-
vincing political perspective to the societies in the region. The future of
Kosovo is undecided, the future of Macedonia is uncertain, and the
future of Serbia is unclear. We run the real risk of an explosion of
Kosovo, an implosion of Serbia and new fractures in the foundations of
Bosnia and Macedonia.
The Commission acknowledges that there are no quick and easy solutions
for the Balkans and that ultimately it is up to the people of the region to
win their own future. But we are convinced that the international com-
munity and the European Union in particular has a historical responsibili-
ty to face and a decisive role to play in winning the future for the region.
The starting point of the International Commission on the Balkans is
that the status quo has outlived its usefulness. There is an urgent need
to solve the outstanding status and constitutional issues in the Balkans
and to move the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and
weak states to the stage of EU accession. This is the only way to pre-
vent the Western Balkans from turning into the black hole of Europe.
At the same time, we are also convinced that the EU possesses the
mechanisms and the requisite political skill to face up to the challenge
which the region will present over the next three years in particular.
There is no doubt that Kosovo and the resolution of its final status will
be at the core of the political process in the months to come. However,
it is essential to bear in mind when addressing this and other unre-
solved status issues that they must be placed within a broader context
of the EU's explicit commitment to include the entire region as defined
at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003.
Getting Incentives Right 
The Balkans needs a new strategy if it is to translate Brussels' stated
political aim to integrate the region into reality. Despite the commit-
ment made at Thessaloniki, the dream of European integration has not
yet proved powerful enough as a force for transforming the societies of
the Balkans, especially if we agree that the basic indicator of success is
the progress of each country on the road to the EU. 
Of course, the EU itself faces a significant dilemma as it has the capacity
to absorb only reasonably functioning and legitimate states. But now that
Croatia appears on the verge of the full accession process, there are no
The starting point of the
International Commission
on the Balkans is that the
status quo has outlived its
usefulness. 
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more of these left in the region. The classical enlargement model that
worked for Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 simply does not fit the con-
ditions prevailing in the Balkans. If this region is to become part of the EU,
it needs to undergo significant changes. But success also requires a con-
comitant shift in policy thinking towards the region in Brussels.
As a matter of common sense, the international community must now
address the unresolved status issues with the greatest degree of urgency
and look for new constitutional solutions within the framework of
European accession.
The question today is no longer, "What should be done?" We should
clearly bring the region into the EU. Rather we need to establish the
sequence of policy steps to be undertaken and the structure of the
incentives that will make them work. We need policies so that the
region can get on, get in and catch up with the rest of Europe.
The question today is no
longer, "What should be
done?" We should clearly
bring the region into the
EU. We need policies so
that the region can get on,
get in and catch up with
the rest of Europe.
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I. THE DANGEROUS STATUS QUO AND THE EU'S
BALKAN DILEMMA
The absence of headline-grabbing violence in the Balkans has persuad-
ed many in the international community that the status quo is working
just fine. This illusion of stability governed international perceptions of
the Balkans until the spring of 2004. But the March events in Kosovo in
2004 brought home to some in the international community what has
been common knowledge in the Balkans for some time: that the status
quo is not only unsustainable, it also might drive the region towards a
new period of highly dangerous instability.
Whether one views it with trepidation or with enthusiasm, the process
of final status settlement in Kosovo has already begun. We have
entered a most delicate phase in the struggle for a peaceful and pros-
perous Balkans. There is a good possibility that the international com-
munity and local political actors will succeed in this difficult quest to
solve the status issues. Such an outcome would almost certainly break
the logjam that is blocking political progress in the region, representing
a major achievement of international diplomacy as well as conferring
immense credit on local political forces.
The status quo is not only
unsustainable, it also might
drive the region towards a
new period of highly dan-
gerous instability.
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But everyone should be aware that failure is also a very real prospect
and that the consequences of failure could be grave indeed. If the EU
does not devise a bold strategy for accession that could encompass all
Balkan countries as new members within the next decade, then it will
become mired instead as a neo-colonial power in places like Kosovo,
Bosnia, and even Macedonia.  Such an anachronism would be hard to
manage and would be in contradiction with the very nature of the
European Union. The real choice the EU is facing in the Balkans is:
Enlargement or Empire.
The signs of such a debilitating future are already visible in the quasi-
protectorates of Kosovo and Bosnia. With no real stake in these territo-
ries, international representatives insist on quick results to complex
problems; they dabble in social engineering but are not held account-
able when their policies go wrong. If Europe's neo-colonial rule
becomes further entrenched, it will encourage economic discontent; it
will become a political embarrassment for the European project; and,
above all, European electorates would see it as an immense and unnec-
essary financial and moral burden. 
There are three major reasons that make us believe that the status quo
is the problem and not part of the solution.
1. Expectations Gap
The status quo is a problem in part because the citizens of the region
perceive it as such. A survey commissioned by the International
Commission on the Balkans and conducted in November 2004 demon-
strates that people in the region are overwhelmingly negative about
the status quo and that there is an alarming distrust towards both gov-
ernment and the opposition (figure 1-3). The public rejects the status quo
but has yet to see any credible alternative being offered in its place
(figure 4).
When we compared our survey to a similar poll conducted in 20023, we
observed a growing trend of public pessimism and dissatisfaction with
the direction of political and economic developments. A loss of hope
and perspective is the political reality of Western Balkans. And it is a
dangerous one.
The real choice the EU is
facing in the Balkans is:
Enlargement or Empire.
3 International IDEA, South Eastern Europe Public Agenda Survey, 2002.
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2. The Development Gap
The status quo is also a problem because it has widened the gap
between the economic and social performance of the region on the
one hand and of the new EU members and Bulgaria and Romania on
the other. The years lost in wars and half-baked reforms have widened
the gap between the winners and losers in Balkan societies, making the
demand for fairness and development stronger than ever.
As others have noted, if the status quo were to prevail, a new European
ghetto would arise in the heart of an integrating continent. This ghet-
to would comprise most of the Balkans' peoples, herded behind a wall
of visa restrictions that blocks a desperate population from seeking
work elsewhere. There is a risk that, instead of catching up with the
rest of the continent, the Balkan countries will fall further behind. The
goal of integration which holds the key to regional stabilization will
become even more distant. (Table 1, 2)
3. The Integration Trap
The consensus uniting governments and people in the Balkans is that
the region cannot achieve prosperity and stability outside the process
of European integration. At the same time, it is quite clear that the dys-
functional states and protectorates that characterise the region active-
ly hinder the inclusion of the Balkans into the European mainstream. In
this sense, the status quo is a problem because it is blocking the road
to EU accession.
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II. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK
In the past decade, the international community has regarded the
Balkans primarily as a post-conflict region. This has led to a raft of pro-
visional solutions to constitutional problems and to policies based on
what might be termed 'constructive ambiguity,' embodied in docu-
ments like the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional
Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. At the same time the international
community has been working on the assumption that economic devel-
opment would reduce the pressing need to solve the open status
issues. Unfortunately, this assumption has turned out to be false.
Policies that focus only on outstanding economic and social issues while
ignoring the unresolved status issues have failed to deliver. Policies that
seek to resolve status questions to the exclusion of urgent economic
and social issues are also doomed to fail. The Balkans need both.
For the EU, one of the greatest policy challenges emerges as a conun-
drum: how might one reconcile the regional approach that is essential
for the stabilisation of the Balkans with the requirement of evaluating
countries on the basis of their individual performances, a concept which
lies at the heart of the EU accession process? The EU-initiated
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In the Balkans, the acces-
sion strategy should be a
mixture of classical state-
building policies with those
aimed at transforming
nation states into member
states. What we face in the
Balkans is a need for a
'member-state building'
strategy. 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) tried to answer this by empha-
sising the central need for regional co-operation as part of the EU's ‘con-
tract’ with individual SAP countries. The past four years, however, have
demonstrated that this does not work. The answer to the riddle remains
elusive. Now, the losers in the accession game - Bosnia, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Kosovo - no longer perceive the SAP as a fast integra-
tion track. The programme lacks the requisite incentives to engage Serbia
in co-operating over the Kosovo issue. It is striking that Partnership for
Peace enjoys a higher public profile in Serbia than the Stabilisation and
Association Process. Only real incentives can bring real reforms.
The new regional approach that the Commission advocates seeks to
reintroduce the missing incentives. The interdependence of states is
much more vital for the future of the Balkans than was the case in any
other part of Europe. These are small and unattractive markets. Their
economic sustainability depends on the creation of a common econom-
ic area that will attract foreign investors. In this sense, the regional
approach is a necessary precondition for development.
In the Balkans, the accession strategy should be a mixture of classical
state-building policies with those aimed at transforming nation states
into member states. What we face in the Balkans is a need for a 'mem-
ber-state building' strategy. 
The Stabilisation and Association Process is simply not strong enough as
a framework for building member states. Neither does it reflect the
intensity and breadth of practical EU involvement with the region.
This strategy would provide for three steps. First, we propose that in the
autumn of 2006 the EU should sponsor a Summit that aims to present all
Balkan countries with their accession road maps. The Summit should
review the achievements of individual states in satisfying the Copenhagen
criteria and on the basis of this, the EU will decide whether to start direct
negotiations on membership or to sign a pre-accession Europe Agreement
on member-state building with those countries that do not yet qualify for
accession talks. In the view of the Commission it is realistic for these coun-
tries to start accession negotiations around 2009/2010, in the belief that
the Europe Agreements will contribute to meeting the Copenhagen crite-
ria. The objective of accession could be set towards 2014/2015.
The experience of Central and Eastern Europe illustrates best how the insti-
tutionalisation of the European perspective is the most efficient way to fos-
ter and accelerate the overall political, economic and administrative reforms
in aspirant countries. This does not mean that all Balkan countries should
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join the EU at the same time, but it does mean an end to the fears of some
Balkan societies that they might be left out of the process altogether.
NATO membership is the second important pillar of our integration strat-
egy. In our view, the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in June 2005
should send a positive signal to the Adriatic Charter countries, Albania,
Croatia and Macedonia. This gesture will improve the security of Balkan
countries still outside the EU and will support reform in the security sec-
tor. We would envision these three countries receiving invitations to join
at the NATO Summit in 2006, based, of course, on the progress of their
Membership Action Plans. NATO played the role of a fast integration
track for the Central and East European countries and it should do the
same for the Balkans. Paradoxically, membership in NATO is the only avail-
able instrument for demilitarising this most militarised part of Europe.
But in order for NATO enlargement to fulfil its regional role, the Alliance
should offer membership in the Partnership for Peace program to Serbia
and Montenegro and to Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUS ISSUES
1.1. The Current Constitutional Environment
After the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, constitutions were written for several
states and other entities in the region. But five years after the wars ended,
the governments created by those constitutions remain weak, unpopular,
and as yet unable to persuade either their people or the international com-
munity that they are ready to enter the European Union (figure 17, 18).
Between 1994 and 2002, international negotiators and local parties
designed constitutional frameworks for the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1994), which was to become one of the entities within
Bosnia; a constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, as part of the
Dayton Accord (1995); changes to the constitution of the Republika
Srpska (1996); a constitutional framework for Kosovo as requested by
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (2001); Macedonia's
new constitutional framework, known as the Ohrid Agreement (2001);
and the new State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, negotiated with
the intensive engagement of the European Union (2002).
These constitutional frameworks have several features in common.
First, they were shaped by elites associated with armed conflicts.  The
processes that led to the constitutions were not informed by popular
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State weakness is perpetu-
ated in those states where
there are influential inter-
national actors on the
scene.  
mandates but by hard-nosed trade-offs to persuade the elites to stop
fighting or avoid other destabilising acts. Power-sharing, not the
enforcement of rights, was the main principle.
A second similarity among the Yugoslav constitutional frameworks is
that each allocates power by group affiliation.  The groups are defined
according to ethnicity, a tendency that reinforces claims that the soci-
eties themselves are riven by ethnic differences which help to under-
mine central state institutions.  In the Bosnian Constitution, in the
Ohrid Agreement, and in the Kosovo constitutional framework, mem-
bers of various ethnic groups are assured specified quotas.
The hard truth is that without these allocations of jobs and decision-
making powers, the peace agreements would have failed. The long-term
consequences have been more subtle.  Local elites attempted to exploit
this to secure the primacy of their particular ethnic group in the constitu-
tional outcome.  There is a major gap between the rhetoric of civil society
that is at the centre of international efforts to democratise the region on
the one hand, and the struggle to enshrine the rights of ethnic groups that
is at the heart of the adopted constitutional arrangements on the other.
Third, the constitutional frameworks created weak states.  Each state
must compete with strongly decentralised powers (especially in the case
of Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro); with parallel structures that are
wholly unaccountable to the constitutional frameworks (particularly in
Kosovo); and with intrusive international structures that have near
monopolies of power which are nonetheless ill-defined in crucial state-
building areas (for example, security in Bosnia and Kosovo).  A conse-
quence of the patchwork regulatory environment is that state actors
became cumulatively weaker while powerful private actors, including
political parties, oligarchs and criminal syndicates spawned by the wars
of the 1990s, have remained influential and largely escaped scrutiny.
This means that non-state institutions provide many basic public services
which would normally be the responsibility of the state. Some individuals
receive pensions, health care and education from neighbouring states (the
best example being the Serbs of northern Mitrovica who are subsidised by
Belgrade). The emphasis on decentralisation in Kosovo may accelerate
the trend.
State weakness is perpetuated in those states where there are influ-
ential international actors on the scene.  
The posts of High Representative in Bosnia and the Special
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Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo were established
during crises. Years later, both continue to exercise extraordinary
power, including the authority to override local decisions.  Neither the
reach of this power nor the occasions for its use are clearly defined or
well understood.  In both Bosnia and Kosovo, there is an often irre-
sistible temptation for both international representatives and local gov-
ernments to shift accountability onto one another. Citizens are left
without a clear idea of who is responsible for what.
1.2. The Perceptions Map
Western governments have frequently argued that postponing the resolu-
tion of key status issues is the lesser of two evils. While they concede that
the status quo is not ideal, they maintain that it is nonetheless essential to
maintain regional peace and stability. The results of the survey commis-
sioned by the International Commission on the Balkans and of the meet-
ings held throughout the region show a more complex reality. The key find-
ings show that Bosnia is no longer a highly contested state. Most Serbs in
Serbia and almost half of the Serbs in Bosnia view the separation of
Republika Srpska from Bosnia as both undesirable and unlikely.
Paradoxically, Albanians in Albania and Kosovo are the only ones that favor
such separation of Bosnia. The survey also indicated that there is no ethnic
group intent on threatening the existence of the Bosnian state (figure 5).
In our view, the nightmare of the international community that
Kosovo's independence would automatically provoke the disintegration
of Bosnia has no foundation in reality. That does not mean that
Kosovo's independence will be a simple or uncontested process. Indeed
if mismanaged, the process could have a most deleterious domino
effect on the region. But independence per se is not the issue - the
issue is how you get there.
According to the survey, the breakdown of Macedonia and the establish-
ment of a Greater Albania are two developments that could destabilise the
region. The results of the survey show a relatively high acceptance of the
idea of a "Greater Albania" among the Albanian populations of both Kosovo
and Albania. As a whole, they differ from other groups in the region in their
view that a future unification of Kosovo and Albania is both desirable and
possible (figure 6). This suggests that the process of nation-building among
Albanian communities in the Balkans is still in progress. If the international
community fails to offer a convincing European perspective to the region, it
might bolster support for a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo among
Albanians. The international community should send a clear message that
Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo is not an option.
But independence per se is
not the issue - the issue is
how you get there.
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In contrast when it comes to the territorial integrity of the Republic of
Macedonia, the survey shows that a great majority of Albanians in
Macedonia reject the idea of dividing the country (figure 7). 77.5% of eth-
nic Albanians (and 85% of ethnic Macedonians) support the territorial
integrity of the Macedonian state.
Both the survey results and our talks in the region suggest that a peace-
ful separation of Serbia and Montenegro does not have the potential
to destabilise the Balkans (figure 8). An interesting point to emerge from
the survey is that most Montenegrins oppose such a separation while
the Serbian public is becoming less keen on retaining the present non-
functional federation.
1.3. Facing the Status Issues
The unresolved status of Kosovo and the provisional constitutional
frameworks in place elsewhere are among the major obstacles for the
Europeanisation of the Balkans. While all states undoubtedly aspire to
EU membership, we still have no clear idea how many will actually
emerge from the current constitutional mess - in theory, Serbia and
Montenegro could apply as one (the State Union of the present day),
two (Serbia and Montenegro as separate states) or even three countries
(adding Kosovo). The integration of the Balkans into the EU is unimag-
inable in the current circumstances of constitutional uncertainty. 
The Commission advocates:
 A four stage transition in the evolution of Kosovo's sovereignty.
Kosovo's sovereignty should develop from the status quo as
defined by Resolution 1244 (stage one) to "independence without
full sovereignty" (stage two) (allowing for reserved powers for
the international community in the fields of human rights and
minority protection), to the "guided sovereignty" (stage three)
that Kosovo would enjoy while negotiating with the EU and final-
ly to "shared sovereignty" (stage four) inside the EU.
 In the case of Bosnia, after ten years since the Dayton Accords,
passing from the Office of High Representative to an EU
Negotiator. This implies jettisoning the Bonn Powers and shifting
responsibility to the Enlargement Commissioner in Brussels. 
 A decision on the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro made by
its citizens. The Commission judges the current State Union as
non-functional. In the view of the Commission, citizens of Serbia
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and Montenegro should choose between a functional federation
and functional separation by the autumn of 2006.
1.3.1. Kosovo's Final Status
Time is running out in Kosovo. The international community has clear-
ly failed in its attempts to bring security and development to the
province. A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucra-
tic assessments of the international community. The events of March
2004 amounted to the strongest signal yet that the situation could
explode. Since then UNMIK has demonstrated neither the capacity nor
the courage to reverse this trend. Serbs in Kosovo are living imprisoned
in their enclaves with no freedom of movement, no jobs, and with nei-
ther hope nor opportunity for meaningful integration into Kosovo soci-
ety. The position of the Serbian minority in Kosovo is the greatest indict-
ment of Europe's willingness and ability to defend its proclaimed
values. Kosovo Albanians should receive a clear message that the use of
violence is the worst enemy of their dream for independence.
The lack of leadership in Belgrade has contributed to the plight of the
Kosovo Serbs, and the Serbian community in Kosovo has to a large
degree become hostage to the political struggles in the Serbian capital.
The Albanian leadership in Kosovo must also shoulder its part of the
blame for failing to show any real willingness to engage in a process of
reconciliation and the development of multi-ethnic institutions and struc-
tures. Our survey indicates that a majority of Kosovars is keen on living in
an "ethnically homogeneous Kosovo" (figure 22). Most Kosovo Albanian
politicians  have done nothing to oppose this public mood which flies in
the face of everything that Europe believes in. 
But a substantial share of the blame for the failure of the project of a
multiethnic society in Kosovo should be placed at the door of UNMIK
and the international community. Over the past few years UNMIK has
on several occasions been actively involved in a policy of reverse dis-
crimination in Kosovo. Under UNMIK's leadership the number of Serbs
employed in the Kosovo Electric Company has declined from more
than 4000 in 1999 to 29 now, out of total of over 8000 employees.
"The international community in Kosovo is today seen by Kosovo
Albanians as having gone from opening the way to now standing in
the way. It is seen by Kosovo Serbs as having gone from securing the
return of so many to being unable to ensure the return of so few."4
The failure of UNMIK can be explained but it should not be tolerated.
The social and economic situation in the protectorate is no less depress-
4 Kai Eide, The Situation in Kosovo. Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Brussels, 15 July, 2004.
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ing. Kosovo suffers endless disruption thanks to its regular power cuts.
Some villages in the provinces are without electricity for periods of
longer than a month.
The province never boasted a self-sustaining economy and there is no
chance that it will develop one now. Currently, the unemployment rate
is about 60 to 70% (almost 90% among minorities). The construction
boom of the immediate post-war period has come to an end. Kosovo
Albanians are frustrated with their unresolved status, with the econom-
ic situation, and with the problems of dealing with the past. The
demand for sovereignty has not diminished; on the contrary, it has
increased in the past year. UNMIK is perceived by the local public as cor-
rupt and indecisive.
The Commission shares the judgment of the UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan that Kosovo has made insufficient progress towards meeting
internationally agreed standards with regard to human rights, respect for
minorities, and law and order. At the same time the Commission wishes
to underscore the urgency of dealing with the final status of Kosovo.
We do not believe that Kosovo's independence will solve all the territo-
ry's problems, but we are concerned that postponing the status talks
will lead to a further deterioration in the situation in the province. 
In our view Kosovo's independence should not be imposed on Belgrade.
The ‘imposition’ of Kosovo's independence is not only undesirable, it is
also unlikely to happen, bearing in mind that some members of the UN
Security Council (Russia, China) are opposed to it. Moreover, if Belgrade
opposes the process, it will significantly increase the chances of trouble
breaking out elsewhere whether in Bosnia, Macedonia or Montenegro.
The Commission is also pessimistic about the possibility of direct talks
alone between Belgrade and Pristina when it comes to solving the sta-
tus issue. It is up to the international community to guide this process.
In our view, negotiations on the status of Kosovo should concentrate on
offering real incentives to Belgrade so that Serbia may find acceptable
the prospect of an independent Kosovo as a future member of the EU.
Persuading Belgrade to engage is difficult but not impossible. If any-
thing can, the EU accession process can provide such incentives. Within
this context, Kosovo's independence should be achieved in four stages. 
The first stage would see the de facto separation of Kosovo from
Serbia. In our view this stage is implicit in Resolution 1244, which trans-
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formed Kosovo into a UN protectorate. This is despite the fact that the
UNSCR 1244 deals with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and not with
Serbia. It is a dangerous illusion that Kosovo can revert to rule from
Belgrade in any foreseeable future.
The second stage (independence without full sovereignty) should
recognise in 2005/2006 Kosovo as an independent entity but one
where the international community reserves its powers in the fields of
human rights and the protection of minorities.  Legally Kosovo will
remain a UN protectorate but the Commission advocates transferring
the UN's authority, as defined by Chapter 7, from UNMIK to the EU.
KFOR should preserve both its mandate and its size. 
Kosovo should be treated as independent but not as a sovereign state
at this stage, allowing it to develop a capacity for self-government. All
functions of a normal government that are currently performed by
UNMIK or KFOR should be transferred to the government of Kosovo. This
government will tax and police the population, regulate the economy
and provide public services. The international community should reserve
its power to intervene in those areas that are essential for meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, namely human rights and minority protection.
In order for this policy to work, we should move away from a ‘standards
before status’ policy and towards a ‘standards and status’ policy.
Decentralisation, the return of refugees, and the clarification of prop-
erty rights are the key questions to be addressed. At this stage the
Commission advocates a special arrangement for the area around
Mitrovica and a special legal status for the Serbian monasteries. A spe-
cial administrative arrangement for Mitrovica (a transitional interna-
tional administration along the lines of UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia)
should exclude the possibility of Kosovo's partition.
The Commission advocates an internationally-supervised census in
Kosovo, including of those who claim to hail from Kosovo, before we
can start designing a programme of decentralisation. The definition of
a ‘Kosovo citizen’ is of critical importance. The long-overdue census
should be complemented by clearing up the property claims in the
province. Disputed property rights are the major obstacle to economic
development in the region. This is true for both private property and
for the ‘social property’ from the Yugoslav period.
The returns policy introduced by the international community in Kosovo
should be modelled on the successful returns policy applied in Bosnia. In
our view, the implementation of the returns policy is of great impor-
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tance. But our conversations with both Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and in
Serbia convinced us that the chances for a large-scale return are minimal.
The international community should provide incentives for Kosovo Serbs
to return even if they prefer to live in the mostly Serb-populated parts of
the province and not in areas where they lived before the war. It should
also take care of those who decide not to go back. A ‘Palestinisation’ of
the refugees who decide not to return to Kosovo could be a major source
of vulnerability for Serbia's democracy. This is why the Commission sup-
ports the establishment of an ‘Inclusion Fund’ to assist the integration in
Serbian society of the Kosovo Serbs who have chosen to remain in Serbia.
This fund should be financed by the European Union.
The decentralisation of power in Kosovo and guarantees of a normal life
for Kosovo Serbs are a pre-condition for engaging Belgrade in a construc-
tive debate with respect to Kosovo's independence. In the view of the
Commission, some of the minority quotas provided for the Albanians in
Macedonia in the Ohrid Agreement should also be given to the Serbs of
Kosovo. Decentralisation should afford Serbian enclaves a real opportuni-
ty for self-government and development. It is essential to appreciate how
Serbs believe that the social and economic difficulties they have experi-
enced over the past five years amount to an intentional policy of discrim-
ination and ethnic cleansing, designed by Albanians and underwritten by
the international community. So, the European Union should develop spe-
cial incentives for companies that employ citizens from ethnic minorities.
The need for policies focused on the needs of minorities should not
obscure that the culture of civil society, and not the principle of ethnic
separation, is at the heart of the European project. The ‘ghettoisation’
of ethnic minorities could promote institutional weakness and dysfunc-
tionality in the future state.
The US's active engagement at this second stage is of critical impor-
tance for a successful outcome of the EU negotiating process. Kosovo
Albanians view the US as a guarantor of their independence and an
American disengagement or a split in the Euro-Atlantic community
could quickly lead to trouble. 
The third stage (guided sovereignty) would coincide with Kosovo's
recognition as a candidate for EU membership and the opening of
negotiations with Brussels. There is a real purpose to this stage as the
EU cannot negotiate with itself  (i.e. with a protectorate which it con-
trols). During this stage the EU would lose its reserved powers in the
fields of human rights and minority protection and would exercise influ-
ence through the negotiation process alone. 
The US's active engage-
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The fourth stage (full and shared sovereignty) will mark the absorp-
tion of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sovereignty
to which all EU member states are subject.
These stages would be an integral part of the overall process of Europe
integration of the Balkans as suggested earlier.
The necessary precondition for both the Serbian government and the
Serbian public is a fast track accession of Serbia to the EU together with
international guarantees for the protection of the interests of Kosovo
Serbs. Croatia provides a precedent in terms of such a fast-track
approach. In our opinion, the fast track for Serbia is a sine qua non. The
EU accession process is the only framework that gives Serbia real incen-
tives if not to endorse then at least to consent to such a fundamental
change in the status of Kosovo as independence represents.
1.3.2. Bosnia: From Bonn to Brussels
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995,
the international mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved some
astonishing successes. It has disarmed roaming paramilitaries, reduced
the size and influence of armies organised along ethnic lines, and over-
seen the restoration of freedom of movement across the country. The
former military frontlines that divided the country into a patchwork of
hostile ethnic enclaves have become largely invisible. In addition,
Croatia and Serbia, ever more attracted by the prospect of European
integration, have as a consequence ceased their attempts to subvert
the domestic constitutional order over this period.
The effects of ethnic cleansing are being eroded through the restora-
tion of property rights of the displaced, and the gradual reintegration
of returnees has changed the environment across much of the country.
More than 200,000 property claims for the repossession of houses and
apartments of those who fled or were driven out during the conflict
have been processed successfully. At the same time, Bosnia and
Herzegovina is more internationally isolated today than it was five years
ago. Together with Serbia and Montenegro, it is one of the last coun-
tries in Europe excluded from NATO's Partnership for Peace program,
which, with members like Turkmenistan, Belarus and Tajikistan, does
not traditionally enjoy a reputation of being an especially exclusive
club. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not yet belong to the World Trade
Organization, whose 147 members include Moldova and Angola. Even
more depressingly, Bosnia has yet to open negotiations for a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The only important European
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organisation that Bosnia has been able to join is the Council of Europe.
Yet in August 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe reviewed the quality of Bosnia's democracy and questioned "the
extent to which the current role of the [High Representative] is compat-
ible with membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Council of
Europe"5. 
The need for constitutional change is high on the political agenda. All
agree that there are serious problems with the present system of fed-
eralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is partly due to the absence of
a coherent structure of regional government.  It is also because of a
tendency to see the federal system as a problem to be overcome, rather
than as a promising model which allows ethnic communities to flourish
side by side and facilitates healthy policy competition. 
The present constitutional architecture is dysfunctional. What is impor-
tant is a constitutional debate that accepts the need to facilitate and
indeed drives forward a reform of the Bosnian constitutional system. 
Along with the need for constitutional change, the main problem that
Bosnia faces today is the transition from its current status as protec-
torate that is defined by the Bonn Powers to a sustainable self govern-
ment guided by the process of EU accession.
The coercive authority of the High Representative (Bonn Powers) was
originally developed in response to threats to the peace process. The
international mission in Bosnia was designed for an unstable environ-
ment in the wake of armed conflict. When its intrusive powers to
intervene in and overrule domestic institutions were developed in
mid-1997, these were intended to head off threats to public order and
attempts by the former warring parties to challenge the integrity of
the state.
However, as the agenda of Bosnian politics has shifted to the very dif-
ferent issues of democratic consolidation and development, the powers
and activities of the High Representative continue to dominate Bosnian
politics. This has blocked the development of self-government which is
a precondition to becoming an EU candidate state.
As long as the Bonn powers of the High Representative exist, they form
the core of post-war Bosnia's unwritten constitution, and all political
calculations are shaped by them.
5 Resolution 1384.
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The talks in Bosnia convinced us that the OHR has outlived its useful-
ness. What Bosnia needs is an EU accession framework that will drive
the constitutional debate in the country.
It does not need a new Dayton, but a framework that will permit gen-
uine constitutional debate. The EU negotiation process can be this
framework and the EU Negotiator can play the role of honest broker in
the constitutional negotiations. 
The Commission advocates the necessity of incremental change.
Assuming that there will be no fundamental constitutional changes
imposed by international decree, any process of constitutional develop-
ment must necessarily begin with what is there at present.  This means
starting from the present reality of Bosnia's federal system of govern-
ment.  It also means acknowledging that constitutional change must
take place in accordance with existing constitutional rules.  State-build-
ing in Bosnia cannot be an open-ended process of centralisation and
concentration of resources for basic constitutional and political reasons.
What is essential, however, is a process of systematically clarifying
responsibilities across all levels of government, and ensuring that
(financial) resources are matched to these responsibilities.
The EU accession process will provide the requisite incentives for the
strengthening of the state's federal structures and for the develop-
ment of policy-making capacity.
1.3.3. Serbia and Montenegro: Functional Federation or 
Functional Separation
The constitutional charter of Serbia and Montenegro adopted on
February 4, 2003 with the mediation of the EU reflects a painful com-
promise reached at a time of great uncertainty. The EU feared that inde-
pendence for Montenegro would encourage Kosovo to declare its inde-
pendence thus provoking a possible destabilisation of the whole region.
The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is a loose one, with central func-
tions largely limited to foreign policy. The two member republics maintain
separate currencies, tax systems, and customs. In addition, according to the
Charter, after a three-year period, either republic has the right to call a ref-
erendum on withdrawal from the union thereby unilaterally dissolving it.
Since the adoption of the constitution, the dynamics of federalist and
anti-federalist sentiment in the two republics has been the subject of a
The talks in Bosnia con-
vinced us that the OHR has
outlived its usefulness.
What Bosnia needs is an
EU accession framework
that will drive the constitu-
tional debate in the 
country.
The EU accession process
will provide the requisite
incentives for the strength-
ening of the state's federal
structures and for the
development of policy-mak-
ing capacity.
The Balkans in Europe’s Future l Report of the International Commission on the Balkans26
permanent if sometimes unenlightening debate. The survey commis-
sioned by the International Commission on the Balkans demonstrates
that support for independence is declining in Montenegro and that the
Serbian elite is ever less inclined to pay the costs of this dysfunctional
federation. At present, the ruling coalition in Montenegro is happy with
the common state precisely because it is gridlocked while for the
Serbian government the construct would only make sense were it to
start functioning properly.
The EU's decision to adopt a dual-track approach with regard to the
SAP for Serbia and Montenegro illustrates just how dysfunctional this
federation has become. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is
treated as one country with two separate accession processes.
In the view of the Commission, next spring's referendum should be
used to identify each republic's preference: a functional federation or a
functional separation. The Montenegrin government's policy of block-
ing the normal functioning of the Federation as a way to cause its dis-
integration should not be tolerated. It is up to the citizens of Serbia and
Montenegro to decide on the future of their existing federation. 
1.3.4 The Secret of Macedonia's Success
By rights Macedonia should have fallen apart by now. The survey com-
missioned by the International Commission on the Balkans indicates that
in the eyes of its own citizens Macedonia is the most vulnerable place in
the Balkans. A great majority of Macedonia's citizens is convinced that
the crisis has not yet run its course (figure 9). A staggering 76% expect
new military conflicts there6. The social and economic situation is
depressing.
And yet, Macedonia has survived all manner of threats, doggedly pur-
suing its goal of European integration. In contrast to several other ter-
ritories, Macedonia was able to prevent a full-scale civil war through a
process of negotiation between the parties and with the assistance of
the EU and the United States. The former Albanian minority's insurgent
leader, Ali Ahmeti, now heads one of the parties in the governing coali-
tion while his Macedonian partner, Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski, was
four years ago, at the time of burgeoning conflict, his resolute oppo-
nent when Minister of Defence. In February this year, however,
Buckovski officially submitted to Brussels the answers to 4,000 ques-
tions that should help the European Commission form an opinion as to
whether the country is ready to start accession talks with the Union.
6 Naturally, this figure represents only a snapshot of the critical situation around the referendum in November 2004.
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So although in theory, Macedonia should not exist, it is actually a mod-
est but significant success story. The country illustrates our thesis that a
final and clear constitutional arrangement and the institutionalization
of European perspectives are the two instruments that can work appar-
ent miracles in the Balkans. The Ohrid Agreement was initially fiercely
opposed by radical nationalist circles in Macedonia but the failure of
the November 2004 referendum on the re-territorialisation of the coun-
try which was a de facto referendum on the Ohrid Agreement demon-
strated that the majority of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians
have now made their peace with the Ohrid Agreement which offers the
best way of holding the country together.
The tragic death of President Trajkovski in February 2004 and the March
events in Kosovo that year were litmus tests for the durability of the
state and for the viability of the Ohrid process. Macedonian institutions
and Macedonian society emerged stronger and with a greater legitima-
cy having met these challenges.
Macedonia's achievement in overcoming its crisis and its determination
to apply for EU membership should have a powerful symbolic impact
elsewhere in the region: it demonstrates how the solving of constitu-
tional issues and a realistic, carefully-calibrated EU perspective has the
capacity to transform Balkan societies.
At the same time the international community should not neglect the
major problem facing Macedonia today. The country is in urgent need
of economic growth and new jobs. The combination of cuts in the pub-
lic administration and the appointment of ethnic Albanians to public
sector jobs in accordance with the quotas agreed at Ohrid may lead to
renewed tensions between the two communities if the unemployed
are not absorbed elsewhere.
Macedonia's name is still disputed by Greece (an EU member state),
along with the fact that the provisional authority in Kosovo refuses to
recognise the demarcation of its border with Macedonia, are sources of
instability in the republic. As elsewhere in the region, the state of polit-
ical parties also gives cause for alarm. Macedonian politics have been
subject to a process of criminalisation for many years and there is a
pressing need to reverse this.
But despite all the risks and misgivings, Macedonia's progress since 2001
demonstrates that if the constitutional questions are resolved and if a
tangible European perspective is on the table, then Balkan societies
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suggesting that integration
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have the potential to get out of the cycle of instability and uncertainty.
It is not by accident that Macedonia is a success in Europe's drive to pro-
mote multi-ethnic solutions in the region.
2. THE INTEGRATION CHALLENGE
The EU's decision to open negotiations with Turkey and Croatia and the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 mean that the remaining
Balkan countries are the only missing pieces from those states that have
been assured membership of the European Union. In contrast to the
others, however, the Balkans contain the possibility of a genuine security
threat in the next few years. Therefore there is a real imperative now to
address the issue of integration for this region. Such a strategy would be
significant not just practically but symbolically as well: for so long dismissed
as Europe's powder keg, if the Balkans were successfully absorbed into the
EU, it would finally banish the possibility of a revival of the type of conflict
which so plagued the continent's 19th and 20th century history. Defusing
the powder keg would be a landmark achievement for Europe.
In security, economic and political terms the Balkans are faced with a
clear choice: to be part of the European Union or to be part of a mar-
ginalised ghetto.
The success of EU enlargement is one of the few unambiguously positive
achievements of the post-Cold War world, indeed nothing short of a
political miracle. In less than a decade, the prospect of EU membership
succeeded in consolidating democratic and market reforms throughout
Central and Eastern Europe. The accession process profoundly trans-
formed societies as diverse as the Polish and the Bulgarian, the Romanian
and the Slovenian. There is now a widespread consensus that it can do
the same for the Balkans. There is, however, one critical difference this
time round - the problem of weak states. The EU lacks experience in the
integration of weak states and territories like Kosovo. So this next round
of enlargement is clearly no longer just a matter of business as usual.
There is ample evidence suggesting that integration helps to stabilise a
region. But there is also evidence indicating that a partial integration
has the opposite effect - it can destabilise an area. As Bulgaria and
Romania (followed presumably by Croatia) move on, there is the real
danger that Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia will clus-
ter together to create a black hole on Europe's periphery - in fact that
process is already underway. A visa regime that builds walls between
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the Western Balkans on the one hand and accession states such as
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia on the other, acts as a strong disincen-
tive to cooperation, leading to a further deterioration in the social psy-
chology of an already depressed region.
2.1 Building Member States
In 1991 the people of the former Yugoslavia embarked on their march
to independence, employing such ancestral European state-building
practices as waging war and ethnic cleansing in the process. They could
reasonably argue that by tradition this was part and parcel of
Europeanisation - everyone else had their own nation states, so why
couldn't the peoples of the former Yugoslavia? But in the eyes of the
new EU-Europe these practices were, of course, abhorrent and the
embodiment of a very un-European Balkanisation. Politically, the
Yugoslav succession states and the EU were talking at cross-purposes
and this turned out to be a major challenge for nation building in the
Balkans. The Balkans are not simply populated by weak states and pro-
tectorates, they also suffer the legacy of failed nation-building projects.
Building functional member states while integrating them into the EU
is Brussels unique challenge in the Balkans. In our view, the EU should
adopt a member-state building strategy that rests on three pillars:
 Developing functioning state administrations using the instruments
of the accession process, also during the Europe Agreement stage;
 Creating a common economic space in the region; 
 Constituency-building through an improvement in the quality of
political representation and ‘smart visa’ policies.
2.1.1. Member-State Building as Institution Building
The member-state building strategy that is advocated here is quite dis-
tinct from the mechanisms deployed by the international community in
other parts of the world and from the EU accession process as typified
by the last wave of enlargement. The objective is not simply to build
stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will seek to strengthen and
not destroy them - rather it is the establishment of a state that the EU
can accept as a full member with absolute confidence.
At present the negotiations and membership talks with the EU focus on
the terms under which applicants will adopt, implement and enforce
the acquis (i.e. the detailed laws and rules adopted on the basis of the
EU's founding treaties), and, notably, the granting of possible transi-
tional arrangements which are limited in scope and duration. 
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The transformation of the
EU accession process into
one of member-state build-
ing implies that the very
negotiating process be 
fine-tuned with a view to
encouraging 
institution building in the
applicant countries. 
The experience of the most recent round of enlargement has made it
clear that the biggest room for improvement lies in the process of
implementation of the rules that make up the acquis. At the heart of
the member state building strategy is the need to move on quickly from
the formal adoption of legislation to the development of the capacity
to implement it. The development of this policy capacity will be
absolutely critical for the prospects of weak Balkan states in their aspi-
ration to join the EU. The negotiating framework needs to be enhanced
so as to include capacity building as its principal and explicit objective.
This should take priority both during the pre-accession Europe
Agreement phase and during negotiations themselves.
The transformation of the EU accession process into one of member-
state building implies that the very negotiating process be fine-tuned
with a view to encouraging institution building in the applicant coun-
tries. EU accession involves the creation of new institutions and the
strengthening of existing ones on a large scale in each candidate coun-
try. To do this, the EU has developed a ‘screening’ mechanism,
effectively taking an X-ray of the state administration. This then results
in the publication of hard-hitting annual progress reports that use the
acquis as a benchmark, and National Development Plans which aim to
buttress public investment strategies. It also involves substantial pre-
accession assistance for rural development, and for the institution build-
ing needed to develop absorption capacity.
Of course, there is no single model EU member state and this presents
a serious obstacle. The EU boasts a variety of practices and constitution-
al arrangements in the fields of justice or tax administration. This makes
Brussels unwilling to recommend specific institutional solutions to EU
candidate countries and so the EU has become a reluctant nation-
builder. But in the case of the Balkans, the European Commission must
assume the responsibility for some of the institutional choices that the
applicants are forced to make. The introduction of the "benchmark"
concept in the negotiating framework for membership talks with
Croatia is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. 
The most recent round of enlargement made it clear that institutional
issues, administrative capacity issues and judiciary issues turned out to
be the most challenging, and yet they were left until last. Our
Commission suggests that instead of starting with the White Book on
the Single Market, the countries of the Western Balkans would be much
better served by a White Book on Freedom, Security and Justice Issues.
In practical terms it means that assisting the countries from the region
in the field of justice and home affairs will be the overriding priority for
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the accession process and that the state of the rule of law will be the
major criterion in evaluating the progress of Balkan countries on their
journey to the EU.
2.1.2. The Regional Market
The establishment of a common economic space on the territory of
the Western Balkans is the second pillar of our strategy. Before the
opening of accession negotiations, free trade in the region, leading to
a customs union with the EU, should be complete. This should be sup-
ported by the facilitating infrastructure. The common economic space
should compensate for the costs related to the emergence of new,
small and economically unviable states in the region. 
Talk of economic integration has been fashionable in the region for
some time but it has yet to develop beyond mere words. There are con-
crete fears and obvious short term costs that have blocked the idea ever
since it was first mooted. More honestly, the Balkan countries are only
likely to buy into the idea if they believe that it will accelerate their inte-
gration into the EU. If they suspect that regional integration is really a
substitute for EU membership, it will be a non-starter. 
The future EU members Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia can play a deci-
sive role in making regional economic integration more attractive to the
rest of the Balkans. 
Our hypothesis is that countries in the region will open to each other
only within a broader framework of opening towards the EU. So, there
are four levels of regional integration that are critical for improving the
growth potential of the region. 
 Completion of free trade area in the region, leading to customs
union with the EU (In the case of Turkey, customs union with the EU
has proven its potential as an instrument for the Europeanisation of
candidate countries.)
 Regional infrastructures, both physical and institutional, that facili-
tate trade and capital flows.
 Legal arrangements between countries that facilitate the handling
of private or public claims against parties in other countries. 
 Labour market and travel policies within the region that support
regional economic integration. Differential speeds of  EU accession
should not impede this process. 
Our hypothesis is that
countries in the region will
open to each other only
within a broader frame-
work of opening towards
the EU.  
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Having said all this, however, the research from recent years suggests
that while regional cooperation may be useful in promoting growth,
impediments to growth in most countries of the region remain fixed
firmly at the national level. 
2.2. Member-State Building as a Constituency Building
A functioning state is not only an administrative entity, it is also a social
phenomenon. The growing gap between the state and key social con-
stituencies is regarded by the Commission as a critical risk for the suc-
cess of the transformative politics of the EU. Reforms to public admin-
istration and signs of positive changes in the economy are not suffi-
cient of themselves to bridge this gap. Political mobilisation and revi-
talisation of the political process is essential here. What is needed is a
new generation of policies that focus on democratisation and on the
quality of political representation which can consolidate and strength-
en pro-reform and pro-European forces in the region. 
2.2.1. Minority Rights and the Culture of Civil Society
There is an apparent tension between the rhetoric of the international
community, which emphasises the desirability of multi-ethnicity, and its
practice, which tends to place the emphasis on accommodating various
group interests in the interests of security. In the past decade, the general
legal and political environment for the harmonious development of
interethnic relations has improved substantially in most parts of the
Balkans. However, the reality of interethnic relations and minority rights
varies greatly. War and ethnic cleansing have resulted in significant demo-
graphic shifts. While all countries of the Balkans still contain multiethnic
areas, most countries are now nation states with a majority amounting to
80 % or more of the population. Albania, Croatia, Serbia (without Kosovo)
and Kosovo (if considered a separate entity) have strong majorities where
most minorities live in a relatively compact part of the country and account
for 10 to 20% of the population. We can talk perhaps about multiethnic
regions but no longer so much about multiethnic countries. Only Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are countries that are
multiethnic as a whole but with no or no strong dominance by one
community7.
The results of the survey done for the International Commission on the
Balkans powerfully confirm the thesis that interethnic relations are much
better on the municipal level than on the level of the country as a whole.
It is also important that with the exception of the Albanians in Kosovo and
7 Florian Bieber, Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe, Discussion Paper, King Baudouin Foundation, 30 September, 2004.
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Albania, no other community favours living in an ethnically pure state. 
At the same time, we have to recognise that the newly fashionable pol-
icy of decentralisation increases the process of ethnic separation in cer-
tain parts of the region. In Macedonia in particular we can observe the
trend towards a consolidation of ethnically homogeneous regions,
resulting largely from the 2001 conflict. The argument for decentralisa-
tion is clear: with more competences exercised on a local level, minori-
ties are able to govern themselves to a larger degree, which in turn
should increase their loyalty to the state. The reality of decentralisation
and local interethnic relations is, however, far from being that straight-
forward. In many cases across the region, from disruptions of the return
of refugees to discrimination against Roma, local governments are
often the most serious violators of human rights. They are less suscep-
tible to international pressure and their actions could become a source
of tension and even destabilisation.
The international community is in need of a policy that will reconcile local
self-governance with the principles of multi-ethnicity. At present, the mon-
itoring of minority rights is focused at national level and on national minori-
ties. This has to change. In the view of the Commission what is important
is that minorities should be recognised not only at national but also at
municipal levels. The international community, for example, must monitor
the situation of the Slav Macedonian minority in Tetovo and the Albanian
minority in North Mitrovica as strictly as the situation of the Albanian
minority in the Republic of Macedonia or the Serbian minority in Kosovo.
2.2.2. Smart Visas, Smart Borders
Among the most discouraging findings of the Commission is that the
European generation of the Balkans, young men and women under 30
who share the values of Europe most keenly and who vote for pro-
European parties most regularly, are those who experience the great-
est difficulties in visiting the EU. More than 70% of students in Serbia
have never travelled abroad. The Commission believes that this should
change as a matter of urgency. This is most urgent for the youth of the
countries which have been most isolated from Europe: Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania. 
Bulgaria and Romania have demonstrated that freedom of movement
within the EU is the strongest signal that the EU can send both to the pub-
lic and to governments in the Balkans. A smart visa policy of the EU that
In the view of the
Commission what is impor-
tant is that minorities
should be recognised not
only at national but also at
municipal levels.
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opens its borders to Balkan youth and Balkan businesses while closing
them for criminals should be at the very centre of policies that will
mobilise popular support for building EU member states in the Balkans.
The Schengen wall is the last wall that separates the Balkans from Europe.
Knowing how sensitive this issue is for the EU member states, the
Commission advocates a two-track approach.
The Amsterdam Treaty integrated EU visa policy into the legal framework
of the Union. On the basis of this Treaty, the European Council adopted
in 2001 a Regulation (EEC/539/2001) that includes Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro in the list of third
countries whose nationals are subject to visa requirements. As long as
the four Western Balkan countries remain on this list, any alleviations of
the visa requirement system can be negotiated only on a bilateral basis. 
On the level of the EU, the Balkan Commission proposes a Europeanisation
of the visa issue. As a first step, the EU should announce that the four
Western Balkan countries will be exempt from visa requirements once they
have met specific conditions. This was promised to Romania back in 2001
and visas were effectively lifted at a later stage once the European
Commission was satisfied that its concerns had been addressed. Such a pol-
icy sets tangible targets for the governments to work towards and to
engage ordinary citizens in the reform process.
A smart visa policy suggests that member states should adopt preferen-
tial regimes for certain social groups from the Balkans. This policy was
developed as a disincentive when Milosevic's collaborators were put on
the EU black visa list. It is time to use the preferential treatment as a
positive incentive. 
In the spirit of supporting the European generation of the Balkans, our
Commission suggests that member states establish a Balkan Student
Visa Programme for 150,000 full-time students in Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania by June
2005. Representatives of the Balkan business communities should simi-
larly benefit from a smart visa policy.
2.2.3. The Hague Dilemma
As we approach the 10th anniversary of Srebrenica, the questions of jus-
tice and reconciliation should be higher than ever on the Balkan agen-
da of Europe. It is the proper time to evaluate the impact of
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
In the spirit of supporting
the European generation of
the Balkans, our Com-
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was
established by Security Council resolution 827. This resolution was passed
on 25 May 1993 against the background of grave violations of internation-
al humanitarian law that had been committed on the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia since 1991, and as a response to the threat to international
peace and security posed by these violations. There are four central tenets
to the ICTY's mission: to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law; to render justice to the
victims; to deter further crimes; and to contribute to the restoration of
peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.
The compliance of governments in the region with the ICTY is central
to the development of good relations between the international com-
munity and the Balkans. The EU has defined compliance with ICTY as a
threshold conditionality when it comes to the process of integration.
The same holds for the Partnership for Peace and NATO. In addition,
the EU regards the success of the ICTY as critical in its struggle to con-
fer legitimacy on the International Criminal Court.
The Commission suggests full cooperation should remain mandatory
for the opening of accession negotiations to the EU and NATO. But the
existing levels of good cooperation with ICTY are satisfactory when it
comes to joining PfP and to signing Europe Agreements.
So far, the Tribunal has played the decisive role in bringing the war
criminals to justice, but it has failed to communicate its mission to the
people in the region. A number of surveys made in the last year demon-
strate that the Tribunal is distrusted by local people and that national-
ist politicians like the Radicals in Serbia have exploited this resentment
in order to fuel anti-European and anti-democratic sentiments.
In our view, the challenge facing the international community at pres-
ent is how to translate the post-war conditionality of the ICTY which is
charged with examining concrete crimes into one that looks forward
and concentrates on the strengthening of European values across
Balkan societies. ICTY threshold conditionality should move away from
its focus on specific individuals to concentrate instead on the willing-
ness of governments and societies to examine the causes and conse-
quences of their troubled past. The focus should be much more on the
ability of the domestic judicial system to deal with war-related crimes
and on the effectiveness of the educational system to promote toler-
ance and reconciliation, than on "delivering" certain individuals. 
What should be put on trial is the readiness of all social institutions
from governments to churches and the history curriculum to deal with
The Commission suggests
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the crimes of the past. The success of this policy can obviously only be
measured over an extended period of time. Coming to terms with the
past is a long term problem for any society. That it is why compliance
with ICTY should now be understood more broadly than simply the
need to bring certain individuals to justice. ICTY should concentrate on
its fourth major goal - to contribute to peace by promoting reconcilia-
tion on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Commission is convinced that current status quo in the Balkans has
outlived its usefulness. There is an urgent need to solve the extant sta-
tus and constitutional issues in the Balkans and to move the region as
a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage
of EU accession. 
The Commission advocates the convening of an EU-Balkans Summit in
the autumn of 2006. The Summit should present a ‘Balkan audit’ to
demonstrate how much money EU countries are spending on the
Balkans. It should put forward a consolidated ‘Balkan Budget’ that
should in the future become an integral part of the Financial
Perspectives of the Union. The EU would only convene the Summit after
a resolution of all the status and constitutional issues that are currently
open. At this Summit each Balkan country will receive its EU road map.
In the case of Kosovo, the Commission suggests a four-stage transition
in the evolution of Kosovo's sovereignty. This should evolve from the
status quo as set out in Resolution 1244 to "independence without full
sovereignty" with reserved powers for the international community in
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the fields of human rights and minority protection; onto "guided sover-
eignty" that Kosovo will enjoy while negotiating with EU; before finally
arriving at "shared sovereignty" inside the EU. In the view of the
Commission, the powers of UNMIK should be transferred to the EU.
In the case of Bosnia, after ten years since the Dayton Accords, the
Commission envisions passing from the Office of High Representative to
an EU Accession Negotiator. This implies moving Bosnia from "Bonn to
Brussels" whereby the EU Negotiator will replace the OHR. Bosnia should
join PfP as soon as possible.
In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the Commission judges the cur-
rent Federation of Serbia and Montenegro to be non-functional. The
citizens of Serbia and Montenegro should decide by the autumn of the
year 2006 whether to opt for a functional federation or functional sep-
aration. In the view of the Commission, the democratic future of Serbia
is key to the progress in the region. The Commission therefore advo-
cates that Serbia and Montenegro be extended an invitation to PfP
immediately and that Serbia and Montenegro as one or as two coun-
tries should start negotiations or be offered a Europe Agreement at the
Balkan Summit in the autumn of 2006.
The Commission regards the success of the Ohrid process in Macedonia
as a model for other parts of the Balkans. Furthermore, it urges the
European Commission to use the suggested Balkan Summit of the EU
to start accession talks with Macedonia by the autumn of 2006 at the
latest. In the summer of 2006, Macedonia should receive an invitation
to join NATO. In the view of the International Commission on the
Balkans, the dispute over the name of the Republic of Macedonia and
the demarcation of the border with Kosovo are sources of potential
instability in the republic. The international community should concen-
trate on resolving these two issues.
The Commission regards the decision of the EU to start negotiations
with Croatia and the prospect of Croatian membership as central to the
integration of the region as a whole into the EU. The Commission also
envisions Croatia being invited to join NATO in the summer of 2006.
The Commission highly estimates Albania's contribution to the general
stability of the region and thinks that Albania should be invited to join
NATO in the summer of 2006 and be offered negotiations or a Europe
Agreement by the autumn of that year thereby triggering the process
of member-state building in the country.
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The Commission urges the US government to play a more active role in
the region. What the Balkans need most is Washington's political atten-
tion to the problems of the region. The Commission is convinced that
only co-ordinated EU-US policies can help the region to get on, get in
and catch up with the rest of Europe.
In the spirit of supporting the European generation of the Balkans, our
Commission suggests that member states establish a Balkan Student
Visa Programme for 150,000 full-time students in Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania by June
2005.
After the success in drawing Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Croatia
into the European Union, the logic for a further enlargement is com-
pelling: without the Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will
remain incomplete. Alternatively, the EU runs a serious risk of allowing
a black hole to emerge on the European periphery that could inflict
considerable harm on the European project. 
2014 is the year and Sarajevo is the place where the European Union
can proudly announce the arrival of the European century.
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GDP per capita in EUR
Source: WIIW Balkan Observatory
Source: WIIW Balkan Observatory
table 1
Foreign Direct Investment
(Net FDI inflow, mln EUR)
table 2
ANNEX
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bosnia 1234 1359 1475 1556 1611
Albania 953 1174 1484 1521 1709
Serbia-Mont 1950 3106 1581 1874 1949
Macedonia 1709 1921 1887 1981 2041
Bulgaria 1481 1674 1920 2101 2249
Romania 1491 1795 2002 2221 2316
Croatia 4102 4502 4998 5451 5747
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Macedonia 30,4 190,1 492,2 82,5 83,5
Albania 39,0 155,0 232,0 143,0 158,0
Bosnia 165,9 158,6 132,8 281,8 337,6
Serbia-Mont 105,0 55,0 186,0 502,0 1197,0
Bulgaria 758,7 1099,7 892,6 951,1 1573,0
Romania 965,0 1161,0 1312,0 1194,0 1587,0
Croatia 1333,0 1177,0 1567,0 627,0 1688,0
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Overall Evaluation
“How would you evaluate the situation in our country in general?“
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Macedonia
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Mean Score
4.6
4.8
3.2
3.1
2.7
2.5
9%
6%
5%
3%
1%
1%
28%
28%
59%
64%
71%
74%
8 The Survey was commissioned by the International Commission on the Balkans and was conducted in November-December 2004
in Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Macedonia the survey was conducted by FORUM –
Centre for Strategic Research and Documentation, in Albania and Kosovo by BBSS Gallup International, in Serbia and Montenegro
and Bosnia and Herzegovina by SMMRI Strategic Marketing Research. The complete data was analysed by BBSS Gallup International.
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(8+9+10)
Bad (1+2+3) 
fig. 1
KEY FINDINGS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY8
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
fig. 2 Trust in Government
“How would you evaluate the Government in our country at present?“
Kosovo
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4%
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53%
44%
67%
65%
77%
Good (8+9+10)               Bad (1+2+3) 
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Good", and 1 - "Bad"
Mean Score
5.1
3.8
4.2
3.0
3.1
2.4
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fig. 3 Trust in opposition
“How would you evaluate the opposition in our country at present?“
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Albania
Macedonia
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
13%
5%
9%
3%
8%
3%
26%
64%
44%
72%
58%
71%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Good", and 1 - "Bad"
Mean Score
4.8
3.1
4.1
2.8
3.5
2.8
52% 35%        9%
43% 36% 19%
22% 39%                   23%
22% 37%                 31%
19% 49%                 25%
19% 42% 34%
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Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
Development Prospects (Optimism / Pesimism)
“In your opinion where is our country heading?“
0%     20%    40%    60%    80%   100%
Better
No progress / not
developing 
Worse
fig. 4
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Republika Srpska Scenario
“How good or bad will be for our country if the Republika Srpska gets separated
from Bosnia and Herzegovina? How likely is this to happen?“
(citizens of respective country)
1    2       3        4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
fig. 5
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"












Annex l Report of the International Commission on the Balkans 43
Albania
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Kosovo
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Unlikely
Very positive
Very negative
Very likely
10
9
8
7
6
4
3
2
1
Albania and Kosovo Scenario
“Do you think it is good or bad for our country if Albania and Kosovo unite in one country?  
How likely is this to happen?“
(citizens of respective country)
1     2      3         4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
fig. 6
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Macedonia Scenario
“Would it be good or bad for our country if Macedonia is separated into 
Albanian and Slavic parts? How likely is this to happen, in your view? “
(citizens of respective country)
1    2       3        4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
fig. 7
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Scenario 1: Albania unit-
ed with Kosovo
Scenario 2: Serbia and
Montenegro split
Scenario 3: Republica
Srpska set apart from
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Scenario 4: Macedonia
splits into two parts
Unlikely
Very positive
Very negative
Very likely
10
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All countries' evaluation of each hypothetical scenario
“How good or bad for your country will be … ? 
How likely do you think is for this to happen?“
1    2       3        4       5        6       7       8        9      10
Scenario 2
Scenario 1
Scenario 4
Scenario 3
fig. 8
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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fig. 9 "There are still military conflicts to come in my country"
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Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 10 Status Quo
“Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: "There have been wars in the 
Balkans. It is best that everything stays as it is now and in the future. 
Otherwise it will just become worse“?“
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Albania
Kosovo
63%
60%
59%
54%
49%
43%
28%
23%
23%
30%
43%
43%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
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Changes of Borders
“Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: "Even if not desirable, 
changes of borders of the Balkan countries may be necessary"?“
Kosovo
Albania
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
Montenegro
58%
58%
36%
36%
32%
24%
25%
31%
36%
45%
46%
39%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 12 Multinational Countries
“Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: "Nationalities in our country can 
live together in one state, only if each nationality is in a separate region"?“
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Albania
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
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31%
25%
22%
17%
15%
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56%
60%
62%
71%
75%
69%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 11
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89% 8%    2%
88% 8%   3%
65% 28%     7%
61% 25%     13%
51% 26% 21%
50% 30% 17%
Albania
Kosovo
Macedonia
Montenegro
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Serbia
Importance of the Nation
0%    20%    40%   60%   80%   100%
Nation is important
to me (8+9+10) 
Neither yes, nor not
(4+5+6+7)
Nation is not impor-
tant to me (1+2+3) 
Mean Score
9.3
9.3
7.8
7.6
6.8
7.0
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "The nation is very important to me" and 1,  "The nation not important to me at all."
fig. 13
fig. 14 "My country is being injured by other countries. 
We have to seek justice, if necessary, through power and the army"
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fig. 15 "The peoples of former Yugoslavia will never 
live in peace together again"
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Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
51% 34%        9%
50% 21% 22%
47% 33%       15%
47% 19%          28%
45% 31% 20%
fig. 16
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Albania
Montenegro
Kosovo
Serbia
EU Integration
“How good or bad for our country will it be if the EU takes steps 
towards / makes its objective the accession of ……. to the EU?“
0%    20%    40%   60%    80%   100%
Excellent / very good
(8+9+10)
Neutral (4+5+6+7)
Bad (1+2+3)
Mean Score
7.3
6.8
6.9
6.4
6.6
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
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fig. 17
EU Integration: Expectations
“How likely is that in the next 5 years the EU initiates a procedure for 
the accession of ... to the EU?“
Albania
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo
Serbia
25%
23%
21%
21%
20%
35%
29%
33%
44%
39%
Very likely / Inevitable (8+9+10)             
Unlikely (1+2+3)
Mean Score
5.1
5.2
5.0
4.4
4.7
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Albania
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Kosovo
Montenegro
Serbia
Unlikely
Very positive
Very likely
10
9
8
7
6
4
3
2
1
EU Integration: Evaluation
“How good or bad for our country will it be if the EU takes steps towards / makes its 
objective the accession of … to the EU?
“How likely is it in the next 5 years that the EU will initiate a procedure 
for the accession of … to the EU?“
1      2       3          4       5           6         7         8         9        10
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina
fig. 18
*10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Excellent/very good", and 1 - "Bad"
**10-point scale is used, where 10 means "Very likely / inevitable", and 1 - "Unlikely"
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Verry negative
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72% 8%   2%   18%
71% 10%   5%   14%
62% 15%       8%    15%
56% 11%      4%        29%
54% 15%       5%       26%
49% 16%      13%      22%
fig. 19 Attitudes to Europe
Definitions: Pro-European : Positive to the EU / come closer to the EUPragmatic: Come closer
to the EUAnti EU: Negative To the EU / stay distanced
Albania
Kosovo
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Pro-European
Pragmatic
Anti-EU
Not sure
85% 6% 3% 6%
80% 4% 8% 8%
39% 0%        37%              24%
35% 19%           24%        22%
26% 25%         16%             33%
17% 27%             28%          28%
fig. 20 Attitudes to the US
Definitions: Pro-American : Positive to the US / come closer to the USAPragmatic: Come closer
to the USAnti American: Negative To the US / stay distanced
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Bosnia & Herzegovina
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Serbia
Pro-American
Pragmatic
Anti-American
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fig. 21 "The peoples of former Yugoslavia will reunite again 
in the end – in the EU"?
Macedonia
Serbia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Montenegro
Albania
Kosovo
63%
62%
60%
56%
42%
35%
21%
20%
28%
19%
34%
48%
Rather Agree               Rather Disagree
fig. 22 New Borders
"It will be best if, under the auspices of the International Community, 
new borders are drawn in the former Yugoslavia and each 
large nationality lives in a separate country/state"
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Serbia and Montenegro (July 2004)
Stojan Cerovic Journalist, Vreme
Goran Ciric Mayor of Nis
Nebojsa Covic Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and
Montenegro
Radivoj Cveticanin Journalist, Danas
Miljenko Dereta Civic Initiatives
Milo Djukanovic Prime Minister of Montenegro
Nemanja Dragicevic Student Union of Serbia
Vuk Draskovic Foreign Minister of Serbia and
Montenegro
Vladimir Goati Social Science Institute
Bratislav Grubacic Journalist, V.I.P. newsletter
Tanja Jordovic Journalist, Pink
Jasa Jovicevic MINA Information Agency
Natasa Kandic Humanitarian Law Center
Dragomir J. Karic Founding President of International
University of Business and Management 
Djoko Kesic Journalist, Kurier
Jelena Kleut Student Union of Serbia
Vojislav Kostunica Prime Minister of Serbia and Montenegro
Bilijana Kovacevic Vuco YUCOM
Miroljub Labus Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and
Montenegro
Milan Lajhner Patrimons trading company
Sonja Licht School of Modern Politics
Svetozar Marovic President of Serbia and Montenegro
Veran Matic Journalist, “B92“
Jelica Minic European Movement
Tomislav Nikolic President, Serbian Radical Party
Danijel Pantic European Movement
Dusan Pavlovic Political Expert
Lila Radonjic Journalist, Mreza
Zeljka Radulovic Vijesti
Dusan Spasojevic Student Union of Serbia
Stojanovic Political Expert
Milka Tadic Monitor Weekly
Srbijanka Turajlic Belgrade University
Ratko Vlajkovic Mayor of Kragujevac
Hoyt Brian Yee Principal Officer, US Consulate, Podgorica
Kosovo (July 2004)
Fisnik Abrashi Associated Press
General Allard Chief of Operations, KFOR
Snezana Arsic NGO Dona, Strpce
Zorica Barac Women Association, Leposavic
Besim Beqaj Kosovo Coordinator for the Stability Pact
Vesna Bojcic Voice of America, Pristina
Nicolas Booth Senior Advisor to the Head of Pillar I
(Police and Justice)
Charles Brayshaw Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary General, UNMIK
Miomir Cankovic Community Coordinator, Lipljan
Zoran Cirkovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Patrice Coeur-Bizot acting DSRSG, Deputy Head of Pillar II
(UNCA, Civil Administration)
Jugoslav Crvenkovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Melihate Dedushi Program Manager, NGO Flaka
Vlada Dimic Village of Staro Gradsko
Zlatko Dimitrov Director of Office of Political Affairs,
Pillar III (OSCE, Institution Building
and Elections)
Florina Duli Sefaj Republican Club 
Milorad Durlevic Director, Fabrika Radiatora
Nafiye Gas MP, Democratic Party of Turks in
Kosovo
Astrit  Gashi Koha Ditore
Bashkim  Gashi Council for the Defense of Human
Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), Prizren
Pater Walter Happel Prizren
Ramush Haradinaj MP and President of Alliance for the
Future of Kosovo (AAK)
Ylber Hysa Kosova Action for Civil Initiative (KACI)
Sadik Idrizi Deputy chairperson and spokesperson
of parliamentary group "Other
Communities" 
Sladjan Ilic Mayor of Strpce
Oliver Ivanovic MP, Member of Democratic Alternative
(DA)
Rev. Sava Janjic 
(‘Father Sava’) Monastery of Decani
Vesna Jovanovic MP, Member of Democratic Alternative
(DA)
Zorica Jovanovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Ljubomir Kragovic MP, Federal Parliament of Serbia and
Montenegro 
Tina Kraja Associated Press
Jakup Krasniqi Minister of Public Services, Secretary
General of PDK
Branislav Krstic Correspondent for Reuters and
National News Agency Fonet 
Dragisa Krstovic MP, Member of Democratic Party (DS)
Dojcin Kukurekovic Vice President of the Serb Chamber of
Commerce in Kosovo, President of the
Association of Small Businesses
Majka Makarije Monastery Sokolica
Leon Malazogu Program Director, Kosovar Institute for
Policy Research and Development
(KIPRED)
Jill Muncy Acting Police Commissioner, UNMIK 
Muhamet Mustafa President, RIINVEST - Institute for
Development Research
Randjel Nojkic MP, Member of Serbian Renewal
Movement (SPO)
Xhevat Olluri President of the Municipal Assembly of
Lipljan
Dragan Petkovic Community Coordinator, Gnjilan
Nebi Quena Kosovo's Public Broadcaster (RTK)
Zivojin Rakocevic Glas Juga and KiM Radio
Bajram Rexhepi Prime Minister of Kosovo 
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Ibrahim Rugova President of Kosovo 
Ahmet  Shala Deputy Director, Kosovo Trust Agency
Blerim Shala Zeri
Bishop Marko Sopi Head of the Catholic Community
Nexhmedin Spahiu Radio Television Kosovo (RTV)
Nevenka Spilkovic NGO NADA, Gjilan
Boban Stankovic NGO Council for Protections of Human
Rights - CPHR
Bogoljub Stefanovic Village of Staro Gradsko
Danko Stolic Village of Staro Gradsko
Naim Ternava Head of the Islamic Community of Kosovo
Hashim Thaci MP and President of Kosovo
Democratic Party (PDK)
Milorad Todorovic Minister-Coordinator for Returns,
Provisional Kosovo Government 
Boban Vignjevic Deputy Mayor of Lipljan
Andreas Wittkowsky Head of the Political and Legal Office,
Pillar IV (EU, Reconstruction and
Economic Development)
Albania (July 2004)
Hans-Peter Annen Ambassador of Germany
Baba Reshat Bardhi Head of Bektashi Community
Sokol Berberi Executive Director, Center for
Parliamentary Studies 
Sali Berisha President of Democratic Party (DP)
Erinda Bllaca Association of Former Property Owners
Carlo Bollino Gazeta Shqiptare 
Luan Bregasi President, Chamber of Commerce
Ylli Cabiri Human Development Promotion Center 
Pantelis Carcabassis Ambassador of Greece 
Ilirian Celibashi Head of the Central Electoral Commission 
Robert Damo Mayor of Korca 
Namik Dokle Deputy Prime Minister
Admir Duraj Association of Former Property Owners 
Alex Finnen Deputy Head of OSCE Presence in
Albania 
Sabri Godo Member of the Steering Committee of
Albanian Republican Party (RP)
Argile Gorea Former Mayor of Durres 
Artan Haxhi Shkoder Mayor of Shkodra
Odeta Haxhia Student of Social Sciences 
Avni Hoxha Local TV owner 
Vasilika Hysi Director, Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights
Attilio Massimo Lannucci Ambassador of Italy 
Gent Ibrahimi Executive Director, Institute for Policy
and Legal Studies
Archbishop Janullatos Head of Orthodox Church 
Grigor Joti General Manager, Infosoft Group
Perparim Kalo Managing Partner, Kalo & Associates
Lefter Koka Mayor of Durres
Koco Kokedhima Publisher, Shekulli Daily News 
Vajdin Lamaj Businessman
Remzi Lani Executive Director, Albanian Media
Institute
Edmond Leka CEO, Western Union 
Arbi Masniku Deputy Executive Director, MJAFT
Movement 
Vjollca Mecaj Executive Director, Women Center
Fatmir Mediu MP, President of Albanian Republican
Party (RP)
Ermelinda Meksi Minister of European Integration
Isa Memia Mayor of Tropoja
Arian Mene General Manager, DEKA Company
Archbishop Rrok Mirdita Head of Catholic Church 
Pirro Misha Director, Book and Communication
House
Alfred Moisiu President of the Republic of Albania
Selim Mucho Head of Islamic Community 
Genc Pollo Chairman of New Democratic Party
(PDR)
Ylli Popa Chairman of the Academy of Sciences
Albert Rakipi Director, Albanian Institute for
International Studies
Edi Rama Mayor of Tirana
Lutz Salzmann Head of Delegation, European Commission 
Dr. Gjergji Sauli President of the Constitutional Court
Kresnik Spahiu Director, Citizens' Advocacy Office 
Igli Toska Minister of Public Order
Ardian Turku Mayor of Elbasan 
Vebi Velija President, VEVE Group 
Steven E. Zate Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of the
United States of America
Leka Zogu Honorary President, Movement of
Legality Party
Macedonia (September 2004)
Ali Ahmeti President, Democratic Union for
Integration 
Zoran Andonovski Vreme
Venko Andonovski University of Skopje 
Stojan Andov Liberal Party
Teuta Arifi Vice President, Democratic Union for
Integration
Siljan Avramovski Minister of Interior
Kristof Bender European Stability Initiative 
Gligor Bishev CEO, Stopanska Banka
Sandra Bloemenkamp Representative of the World Bank in
Macedonia
Lawrence Butler Ambassador of the USA
Romeo Dereban Mayor of Struga
Donato Chiarini Head of Delegation, Delegation of the
European Commission
Den Donchev VMRO - Narodna
Jovan Donev Euro-Balkan Institute
Tobias Flessenkemper Program Coordinator, EU Police
Mission in Macedonia (PROXIMA)
Lubomir Frckovski Former Minister of Interior and Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia
Branko Gerovski Dnevnik Daily
Zvetan Grozdanov President of Macedonian Academy of
Sciences
Nikola Gruevski VMRO-DPMNE
Riza Halimi Mayor of Presevo (Kosovo)
Lurzim Haziri ADI
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Lutfi Haziri Mayor of Gjilan/Gnjilane, Kosovo
Guner Ismail Forum Magazine
Murtezan Ismaili Mayor of Tetovo
Georgi Ivanov Social Democratic Institute
Zoran Jachev Transparency Macedonia 
Svetozar Janevski Pivara Skopja AD
Saso Klekovski Macedonian Center for International
Cooperation 
Hari Kostov Prime Minister of Macedonia 
Slobodan Kovacevski Mayor of Kumanovo
Vladimir Milchin Open Society Institute Macedonia
Ognyan Minchev Institute for Regional and International
Studies, Bulgaria
Sasho Ordanovski Forum Magazine
Vlado Popovski University of Skopje
Erol Rizaov Utrinski Vesnik Daily
Kevin Ross Representative of the International
Monetary Fund in Macedonia 
Iso Rusi Albanian language weekly Lobi
Michael Sahlin EU Special Representative in Macedonia
Behicudin Sehapi El Hilal 
Radmila Shekerinska Deputy Prime Minister of Macedonia 
Gordana Siljanovska University of Skopje
Archbishop Stefan Head of Orthodox Church
Veton Surroi Publisher, Koha Ditore, Kosovo
Attila Szendrei CEO, Makedonski Telekomunikacii
Sladjana Taseva former chair of Macedonia's Anti-
Corruption Commission, director of
the Police Academy
Biljana Vankovska University of Skopje
Arben Xhaferi President Democratic Party of Albanians
Richard Zink Director European Agency for
Reconstruction (Thessalonica)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 2004)
Nidzara Ahmetasevic Slobodna Bosna
Fatmir Alispahic Valten Newspaper
Edo Arsnalagic Bosnaljek Pharmaceutics Sarajevo
Paddy Ashdown High Representative, OHR
Ivan Barbalic President of the Alumni Association of
the Center for Interdisciplinary
Postgraduate Studies
Becirevic Mayor of Municipal Centre Sarajevo
Taida Begic Deputy Director of the Center for
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies
Ivica Cavar Centers for Civil Initiatives, Mostar
Dragan Cavic President, Republika Srpska; Chairman, SDS
Mustafa Ceric Head of Islamic Community
Dragan Covic Presidency Member (Croat), National
Government, HDZ
Dragoljub Davidovic Mayor of Banja Luka
Saba D'Elia Ambassador of Italy
Boris Diviak Transparency International
Srdan Dizdarevic Helsinki Committee on Human Rights
Dino Djipa PRISMA
Petar Djokic Former President of Federal Assembly,
Socialist Party of Republika Srpska
Milorad Dodik Chairman, SNSD 
Sacir Filandra Professor of Political Science
Jakob Finci Head of Jewish Community
Emina Ganic Director, Sarajevo Film Festival
Dobrila Govedarica Executive Director, Soros Foundation
Nedzad Grabus Islamic Faculty, University of Sarajevo
Tomo Grizelj Chairman of Bosnian Business
Association
Nedzad Hadzimusic Ambassador, Multilateral Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Michael Humphreys Delegation of the European
Commission
Jasmen Imamovic Mayor of Tuzla
Mladen Ivanic Minister of Foreign Affairs, National
Government, PDP 
Bakir Izetbegovic Deputy Chairman, SDA
Hamdija Jahic Mayor of Mostar
Zvone Jukic Dnevni List, Mostar
Eldin Karic Editor in Chief, START Magazine
Freiherr von Kittlitz 
und Ottendorf Ambassador of Germany
Zeljko Komsic Mayor of Novo Sarajevo, SDP
Boro Kontic Director, Media Centar
Zeljko Kopanja Nezavisne Novine Newspaper
Senka Kurtovic Oslobodenje Daily
Lejla Letic Student of the Postgraduate Course,
Human Rights and Democracy in
Southeastern Europe
Sefic Lojo
Ivan Lovrenovic Journalist, Dani
Markovic Former Mayor of Municipal Centre
Sarajevo, SDP
Douglas McElhaney Ambassador of USA
Dapo Mirsad Brcko District Government
Dino Mustafic Director, MESS Theatre Festival
Hilmo Neimarlija Head of IC Council
Zlatan Ohranovic Executive Director, Centers for Civil
Initiatives
Orucevic Former Deputy Mayor of Mostar
Zarko Papic Economy Expert, IBHI
Borislav Paravac Presidency Chairman (Serb), National
Government, SDS
Zeljko Paukovic Youth Communication Center
Senad Pecanin Dani
Zoran Puljic Executive Director, Mozaik -
Community Development Foundation
Fahrudin Radoncic Owner, Dnevni Avas 
Nikola Radovanovic Minister of Defence, National
Government, SDS
Brothers Sabanovic Bosmal
Vehid Sehic director of the Forum of Tuzla Citizens
Hilmo Selimovic Brewery Sarajevo
Fadil Sero Executive Manager, Civil Society
Promotion Center
Faruk Sirbegovic contruction businessmen
Zekerijah Smajic Sense agency
Adnan Terzic Chairman, Council of Ministers, National
Government; Deputy President of SDA 
Sulejman Tihic Presidency Member (Bosniak), National
Government; President of SDA
Neven Tomic Former Mayor of Mostar
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Osman Topcagic Director, EU Integration Department
at Council of Ministers 
Henry Zipper de Fabiani Ambassador of France
Kresmir Zubak New Croat Initative
Edin Zubvevic Director, Jazz Festival
Croatia (December 2004)
Tomo Aracic President, Association of Croatian
Settlers from BiH (ZUNH), Knin 
Damir Azenic GONG 
Zvjezdana Bajic-Zeljak Association Zvonimir Knin
Ivan Begovic County Prefect of Viroviticko-
Podravska County 
Nikolina Colovic Activist from Knin 
Mirela Despotovic Center for Civil Initiatives 
Milan Dukic Mayor of Donji Lapac, Member of
Serbian National Party (SNS)
Andrea Feldman President, Soros Foundation Croatia 
Boris Grigic Head of EU Department, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
Nenad Ivankovic President of Party "Independence and
Progress" (SIN)
Ivan Jakovic County Prefect of Istarska County 
Suzi Jasic GONG 
Ljubo Jurcic MP, Professor at Faculty of Economics 
Bojana Kovacic Central State Administrative Office 
Josip Kregar Professor at the Faculty of Law,
University of Zagreb
Bruno Lopandic Vjesnik 
Zoran Maksic Director of Finance Agency (FINA)
Stjepan Mesic President of the Republic of Croatia
Sasa Milosevic Serbian Democratic Forum
Sladana Miocic former Assistant Minister, Ministry of
Environmental Protection 
Sevko Omerbasic Head of Islamic Community in Croatia
Miroslav Parac Businessman from Knin 
Petar Pasic Mayor of Evenik 
Nebojsa Paunovic UNHCR Office Knin 
Antun Petrovic President, Transparency International
Croatia 
Milorad Pupovac Vice-President of Independent
Democratic Serb Party (SDSS)
Vesna Pusic President of Croatian People's Party (HNS)
Ivica Racan President of Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Miroslav Rozic Vice President of Croatian Party of the
Right (HSP)
Nikola Safer County Prefect of Vukovarsko-
Srijemska County 
Ivo Sanader Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia
Zdenka Sintraga Association Hocu Kuci  
Olgica Spevec Agency for the Protection of Market
Competition 
Gordana Stojanovic Coalition for Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights
Vojislav Stanimirovic President of Independent Democratic
Serb Party (SDSS)
Mladen Vedris Economic analyst 
Damir Vidovic Komunalno Poduzece Knin 
Boris Vujcic Deputy Governor, 
Croatian National Bank
Kosovo (February 2005)
Goran Bogdanovic Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija
Ramush Haradinaj Prime Minister of Kosovo
Oliver Ivanovic Leader of Serbian List for Kosovo and
Metohija
Marko Jaksic Law student, Kosovska Mitrovica
Stojna Jevtic Director of elementary school 21.
Novembar" in Gojbulja
Vesna Jovanovic Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija;
Member of Democratic Alternative (DA)
Faruk Korenica Public prosecutor, Kosovska Mitrovica
Bratislav Kostic Teacher at elementary school 21.
Novembar", Gojbulja
Stojan Kovacevic Coordinator for the Serbian communi-
ty in the Office for Minorities
Nebojsa Maric Public servant, Kosovska Mitrovica 
Suncica Masic Director of the Center for Social Work,
Priluzje 
Snezana Milic Village of Vucitrn
Vuceta Milenkovic Teacher at elementary school 21.
Novembar", Gojbulja 
Adem Mripa Kosovska Mitrovica
Randjel Nojkic Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija,
Member of Serbian Renewal Movement
Misko Popovic Community Coordinator in Vucitrn 
Slavisa Petkovic Minister for Returns 
Ibrahim Rugova President of Kosovo
Zecir Rusiti Kosovska Mitrovica
Veton Surroi President of ORA (Time")
Dragisa Terentic Village of Priluzje 
Hashim Thaci MP and President of Kosovo
Democratic Party (PDK)
Macedonia (February 2005)
Silvana Boneva VMRO-DPMNE
Vlado Buckovski Prime Minister of Macedonia
Argon Buxhaku Vice President of the Democratic Union
of Integration 
Branko Crvenkovski President of the Republic of Macedonia
Nikola Gruevski President of VMRO-DPMNE
Gordana Jankuloska General Secretary, VMRO-DPMNE
Trajko Slaveski VMRO-DPMNE
Arben Xhaferi Leader of the Democratic Party of
Albanians 
Serbia (February 2005)
Srdjan Bogosavljevic Strategic Marketing
Nebojsa Covic President of the Joint Coordinating
Center for Kosovo and Metohija
Biljana Jovic Joint Coordinating Center for Kosovo
and Metohija
Vojislav Kostunica Prime Minister of Serbia and Montenegro
Jelica Minic European Movement in Serbia
Boris Tadic President of Serbia and Montenegro
Biographies of Commission Members l Report of the International Commission on the Balkans58
GIULIANO AMATO
Former Prime Minister
Italy
Mr. Amato was Prime Minister from 1992 to 1993 and from
2000 to 2001. Thereafter he served as Vice President of
the Convention.
Mr. Amato was a Member of Parliament from 1983 to
1994; Under Secretary to the Prime Minister's Office from
1983 to 1987; Minister for the Treasury from 1987 to 1989
and from 1999 to 2000; Minister for Constitutional
Reforms from 1998 to 1999; Deputy Prime Minister from
1987 to 1988. He also headed the Italian Antitrust
Authority from 1994 to 1997.
Full Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at the
University of Rome, School of Political Science, from 1975
to 1997, he had been Full Professor at the Universities of
Modena, Perugia, Florence. Presently he is Global Law
Professor at the NYU Law School and part time Professor
at the EUI in Florence.
Mr. Amato has written books and articles on the economy
and public institutions, personal liberties, federalism and
comparative government. 
CARL BILDT
Former Prime Minister
Sweden
In Sweden, Mr. Bildt served as Member of Parliament
from 1979 to 2001, Chairman of the Moderate Party from
1986 to 1999 and Prime Minister from 1991 to 1994. 
Mr. Bildt served as European Union Special Representative
to the Former Yugoslavia as well as the first High
Representative in Bosnia between 1995 and 1997, and
then as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to the Balkans between 1999 and 2001.
In the United States, he is the only non-US member of the
Board of Trustees of the RAND Corporation and on the Board
of the Centre for European Reform as well as the Council of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 
Apart from numerous other awards, Mr. Bildt has an hon-
orary degree from the University of St. Andrews in
Scotland, where he is a Fellow at its renowned Institute
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.
AVIS BOHLEN
Former Assistant Secretary of State 
United States
Until May 2002, Ms. Bohlen was Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control. A career Foreign Service officer,
she also served as US Ambassador to Bulgaria, Deputy
Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Paris, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian affairs for
European security issues. She previously served as Director
of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs,
Executive Director of the US Delegation to the US-Soviet
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva, Deputy Political
Counsellor at the US Embassy in Paris, and Chief of the
Strategic Affairs and Arms Control Section in the Office of
NATO Affairs. 
Currently member of the Board of Directors of the
International Research and Exchange Board IREX in
Washington, DC. In 2003 was a Public Policy Scholar at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre. 
Ms. Bohlen received the President's Distinguished Service
Award in 1991. 
JEAN-LUC DEHAENE
Former Prime Minister
Belgium
Mr. Jean-Luc Dehaene gained his degrees in law and eco-
nomics at the Universities of Namur and Leuven. From 1971,
he held the position of advisor, then as Head of Cabinet for
several different Ministers. He first held a ministerial post in
1981. From 1988 to 1992, he then became Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Traffic and Transport and
Institutional Reform. Finally, as Prime Minister, he led two
governments, from 1992 to 1995, and subsequently from
1995 to July 1999. 
He is seen as the architect of state reform. He led Belgium into
the Euro economy and reorganised the government finances.
Mr. Jean Luc Dehaene was vice chairman of the European
Convention and is at present a Member of the European
Parliament.
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KEMAL DERVIS
Member of Parliament
Turkey
Mr. Dervis holds a Degree in Economics from the London
School of Economics and Political Science and a PhD in
Economics from Princeton University, USA.
Following his studies, Mr. Dervis lectured at the
Department of Economics of the Middle Eastern Technical
University. In 1973-1976, he served then Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit as an advisor on issues relating to the econ-
omy and international relations. He then returned to
Princeton University teaching economics and international
relations. 
In 1978, he took office at the World Bank, where in 1991 he
became Head of the Central Europe Department, includ-
ing former Yugoslavia and Albania.  In 1996, he became a
Vice-President of the World Bank in charge of Middle East
and Africa Region. In May 2000, he was appointed Vice-
President responsible for Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management. In March 2001 he left the World bank to
become Minister for Economic Affairs of his country, called
back to deal with the financial crisis that erupted in
February 2001. After the crisis was overcome he resigned
from the government in August 2002 and was subsequent-
ly elected to Parliament in November of 2002. He also rep-
resented the Turkish parliament in the Convention for the
Future of Europe. 
Mr. Dervis has published numerous articles on economic
policy and development economics. He is co-author of
"General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy" and
recently published a new book entitled "A Better
Globalization".
MIRCEA DAN GEOANA
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Romania
An alumnus of the Polytechnic Institute and, respectively,
the Law School at the University of Bucharest, Mr. Mircea
Geoana graduated in 1992 the "Ecole Nationale
d'Administration" in Paris, France. He served as professor
at the National School for Political and Administration
Sciences and the "Nicolae Titulescu" University in
Bucharest. He graduated the 1999 World Bank Group
Executive Development Program at the Harvard Business
School.
In February 1996, was appointed Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Romania to the
United States of America. Prior to his appointment to
Washington, he was Director General at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Romania. From 1993 to 1995 he also
served as Spokesman for the Romanian Foreign Ministry.
Mr. Mircea Geoana was Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Romania in 2000-2004. In this capacity, he served as OSCE
Chairman-in-Office in 2001. In December 2004 he was
elected Member of the Romanian Senate.
KIRO GLIGOROV
President of the Republic of Macedonia (1991-1999)
Mr. Gligorov graduated from the Law Faculty in Belgrade
in 1939. At the outbreak of the Second World War, he took
part actively in the anti-fascist and people's liberation
movement in Macedonia. From 1945 to the beginning of
the 60s, he held specialised executive functions in the
spheres of economy and finance in Belgrade. From 1963 to
1969 he was Minister of Finance of the SFR of Yugoslavia.
One of the leading economists supporting the advance-
ment of market economy in Yugoslavia, he was elected a
member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (1974-1978) and President of the Parliament
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thereafter
he was forced to abstain from political activities.
At the onset of the crises in Yugoslavia (1989-1990) he
made a comeback in the political life of Macedonia, pro-
moting multi-party elections and the introduction of a
market economy. These activities resulted in his election as
President of the Republic of Macedonia, in the first free,
multi-party elections held in January 1991. 
While he was in office as President, the Republic of
Macedonia proclaimed its independence and became the
only Republic of the former SFR Yugoslavia to attain its
independence though a peaceful and legitimate manner. 
On the first general presidential elections in the Republic
of Macedonia held in October 1994, Mr. Kiro Gligorov was
re-elected President of the Republic of Macedonia with a
five year term, which he completed in 1999.
ISTVAN GYARMATI
Chairman, Centre for Euro Atlantic 
Integration and Democracy
Hungary
Mr. Gyarmati is currently Chairman of the Board of the
Centre for Euro Atlantic Integration and Democracy in
Budapest and Co-Chairman of the International Security
Advisory Board for Southeast Europe of the Geneva-based
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 
He has been a Foreign Service officer since he graduated
from the Budapest University of Economics, Faculty of
Diplomacy, in 1974. His postings include member of the
Hungarian delegation to the MBFR and IAEA (1981-86,
Vienna), to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting (1987-89,
Vienna), Head of Delegation to the CFE, CSBM, Opens
Skies Negotiations (1990-92, Vienna), Head of Security
Policy Department, MFA (Budapest, 1992-96); Personal
Representative of the CSCE/OSCE Chairman-in-Office in
Georgia (1992-93), Chechnya (1995) and the Negotiations
on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), Chairman of
the OSCE Senior Council (1995), Executive Secretary of the
Budapest CSCE Summit (1994); Under-Secretary of
Defence (1996-99), Chairman of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (1998-99), Chief Adviser of the Foreign
Minister on Security Policy and Chairman of the OPCW
(1999-2000), Senior Vice President for Policy and Programs
of the East West Institute. 
Mr. Gyarmati holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and is a can-
didate of Strategic Studies. He is member of the IISS, of
numerous scientific projects, Associate Professor at the
Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University. He is author of
numerous publications on security policy, European secu-
rity, conflict management and Hungarian defence policy.
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG
Director
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
France
Mr. Heisbourg began his career as a member of the
French foreign ministry's policy planning staff followed by
a position at the French Permanent Mission to the U.N.
(New-York). 
From 1981-84 he was the International security adviser to
the French Minister of Defence as well as a founder mem-
ber of the French-German Commission on Security and
Defence. He took over the Directorship of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London. In the years 1992-98, he was Senior Vice-
President (Strategic development) at MATRA-Defense-
Espace and subsequently was made Director of the
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique in Paris. He is
adviser to the French Foreign Ministry Planning Staff;
Board member of the Aspen Institute in Berlin and
Member of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of
Arts, Manufacture and Commerce; Chairman, Geneva
Centre for Security Policy.
Mr. Heisbourg has published numerous articles and inter-
views in the academic and general media in both English
and French among which 'Hyperterrorisme: la nouvelle
guerre', 2001, and 'La Fin de l'Occident? L'Amérique,
l'Europe et le Moyen Orient', 2005.
BRUCE P. JACKSON
President
Project on Transitional Democracies
United States
Mr. Bruce Jackson is the founder and President of the
Project on Transitional Democracies, a multi-year endeav-
our aimed at the integration of post-1989 democracies
into the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic. 
From 1986 to 1990, he served in the Office of the Secretary
of Defence in a variety of policy positions pertaining to
nuclear forces and arms control. In 1990, Mr. Jackson
joined Lehman Brothers, an investment bank in New York.
Between 1993 and 2002, Mr. Jackson was Vice President
for Strategy and Planning at Lockheed Martin Corporation.
From 1995 until 2003, he was the President of the US
Committee on NATO, a non-profit corporation formed in
1996 to promote the expansion of NATO and the strength-
ening of ties between the United States and Europe.
During the 2002-2003, he served as the Chairman of the
Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.
He continues to serve on the Board of Directors of the
Project for the New American Century, a non-profit corpo-
ration involved in educating American opinion on foreign
policy and national security.
ZLATKO LAGUMDZIJA
President, Social Democratic Party
Former Prime Minister 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mr. Lagumdzija holds a Ph.D. in computer Science and
Electrical Engineering at University of Sarajevo. He is a pro-
fessor of Management Information System at the School
of Economics and at the Computer Science and Electrical
Engineering School, University of Sarajevo since 1989.
President of the Social Democratic Party of B&H (SDP)
since 1997. Member of Parliament of B&H, House of
Representatives since 1996.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of B&H (Prime
Minister) 2001 - 2002. Minister of Foreign Affairs of B&H in
2001 - 2003. Acting Prime Minister 1993. Deputy Prime
Minister of B&H 1992 - 1993.
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Member of "Global Leaders for Tomorrow" of the World
Economic Forum, since 1998. Awarded with numerous
international and national awards for his professional and
expert results. 
Postdoctoral research at MIS Department and CCIT at
University of Arizona, Tucson 1988/89. Consultant to various
business and governmental organizations. Author over hun-
dred research and expert papers and four books in MIS
area. Author of numerous articles on Bosnian political and
economic issues and series of independent TV forums on
Bosnian future.
ILIR META
Former Prime Minister
Albania
Mr. Ilir Meta is Chairman of the Socialist Movement for
Integration, which began in September 2004 as a reform
movement within the Socialist Party. He has graduated
from the Faculty of Economy, Tirana University. He was
involved in political life at the beginning of the 1990s as a
member of the leadership of the Student Movement. A
member of the Socialist Party Leading Council since 1992,
Mr. Meta was SP vice chairman during 1993-1996. In the
period 1996-1997, Meta was deputy chairman of the
Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission. 
Mr. Meta was appointed Prime Minister of Albania in
1999, and was reconfirmed in this post after the June 2001
elections. Mr. Meta resigned in January 2002 to give way
to a solution of a government crisis.  
In August 2002 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, from which he resigned in
June 2003, as result of the failure of the government to
pursue the reforms toward EU integration.
NEVEN MIMICA 
Former Minister for European Integration 
Croatia
Mr. Mimica received in 1976 a degree in Economics from
the University of Zagreb and in 1987 a Master's degree
from the Faculty of Economics. 
Between 1979-83 he was a Research Associate and Adviser
at the Republic Committee for International Relations, in
1983-87 he became Assistant to the President of the
Republic Committee for the International Relations in
Charge of Foreign Exchange System and Foreign Trade
System.
Between 1987 and 1997 he served at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. 
In 1997 Mr. Mimica was appointed Assistant Minister for
International Economic Relations at the Croatian Ministry
of Economy. In 2000, he was appointed Chief Negotiator
for Stabilization and Association Agreement and Deputy
Minister of Economy of the Republic of Croatia. In 2001-
2003 he occupied the position of Minister for European
Integration. Since November 2003 he is member of the
Croatian Parliament.
DAME PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES
Former Governor of BBC
United Kingdom
Ms. Dame Pauline Neville-Jones is Chairman of QinetiQ
Group plc, a defence technology company with govern-
ment customers in the UK and USA and Chairman of the
Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC).  She is a
member of the UK governing Board of the International
Chambers of Commerce (ICC) and of the governing
Council of Oxford University.
From 1998-2004 she was the International Governor of the
BBC with responsibility, among other things, for external
broadcasting, notably the BBC World Service (radio and
online) and BBC World (television).  
Prior to that, she was a career member of the British
Diplomatic Service serving, among other places, in
Singapore, Washington DC, the European Commission in
Brussels and Bonn. She was a foreign affairs adviser to
Prime Minister John Major (1991-1994), chairman of the
Joint Intelligence Committee in Whitehall (1993-1994). As
Political Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (1994-96), she was leader of the British delegation
to the Dayton peace conference on Bosnia.
She is a graduate of Oxford University and was a Harkness
Fellow of the Commonwealth Fund in the United States
(1961-1963).  She was made a Dame Commander of the
Order of St Michael and St George (DCMG) in 1995. She is
a Doctor of the Open and London Universities.
JANEZ POTOCNIK
Member of the European Commission
Slovenia
Mr. Janez Potocnik graduated with honours from the
Faculty of Economics at the University of Ljubljana, where
he did his Ph.D. degree in 1993. 
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For several years (1989-1993), he worked as a researcher at
the Institute of Economic Research in Ljubljana. In July
1994, he was appointed Director of the Institute of
Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the
Republic of Slovenia. In 1998 he was appointed Head of
the Negotiating Team for Accession of the Republic of
Slovenia to the European Union. 
In 2002, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia
appointed Mr. Potocnik the Minister without portfolio
responsible for European Affairs.
Since 2004 he is Member of the European Commission
responsible for Science and Research.
ALEXANDROS GEORGE RONDOS
Former Ambassador at Large
Greece
Mr. Rondos, a Greek national, born in Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania, was educated in Kenya and the UK where com-
pleted BA (Hons) at Oxford University (Brasenose College). 
Career has included journalism at West Africa Magazine, fol-
lowed by twelve years work in relief and development work.
After two years at the World Bank, became an adviser to
the Foreign Minister of Greece, counselling him and imple-
menting changes in Greek strategy in the Balkans as well
as helping manage the Greek Presidency of the European
Union during the Iraq crisis. 
Throughout this period also served as a personal envoy of
the Foreign Minister on missions to Turkey, governments
in the Middle East, Europe and the USA. 
GORAN SVILANOVIC 
Chair, WT I, Stability Pact for SEE
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs
Serbia and Montenegro
Mr. Svilanovic graduated from Belgrade University's School
of Law in 1987, and received his M.A. degree in 1993. At
the end of 1998, Svilanovic, along with another six profes-
sors, was expelled from the Law School for his participa-
tion in a strike organized to protest against the new and
restrictive university Law. 
In 1993 Mr. Svilanovic organized a legal aid department "SOS
line for the victims of national, ethnic and religious policy
and trade union discrimination" in the Centre for Anti-War
Action, dealing with the protection of minorities in Serbia. 
In December 1995, Mr. Svilanovic was elected president of
the centre's Council for Human Rights in Belgrade, mem-
ber of FIDH.
President of the Civic Alliance, political party 1999-2004.
Member of Federal Parliament 2000-2003. Federal
Minister of foreign affaires of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, later Serbia and Montenegro, 2000-2004.
Since January 2004 Member of the Parliament of Serbia.
Since November 2004, Chair of the Working table I of the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
In 1996 the University of Belgrade published his book "Proposal
for Repetition of Legal Proceedings." Svilanovic wrote a large
number of articles in the sphere of law, most of them concen-
trating on the condition of human rights in Yugoslavia.
RICHARD VON WEIZSÄCKER
President of Germany (1984 - 1994)
Mr. Richard von Weizsäcker studied philosophy and histo-
ry in Oxford and Grenoble. In 1938 he joined the army and
participated in World War II. In 1945-1950, Mr. von
Weizsäcker continued his studies in Göttingen. 
Mr. von Weizsäcker was elected to the Bundestag in 1969.
He served as vice president of the Bundestag (1979-1981),
but he resigned the office to become the governing
mayor of West Berlin (1981 - 1984).
In 1984, Mr. von Weizsäcker as the CDU/CSU candidate
won the presidential election. On May 8, 1985 - the 40th
anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe - he
made a dramatic speech to the Bundestag that articulat-
ed the historic responsibility of Germany and Germans for
the crimes of Nazism. Running unopposed for the first
time in the history of presidential elections in Germany,
Weizsäcker was re-elected in 1989. His second term wit-
nessed the process of the unification of Germany and col-
lapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
He was one of the "Three Wise Men" who were request-
ed by the President of the European Union, Romano
Prodi, to elaborate suggestions for institutional reform of
the European Union in preparation for the integration of
new member states (1999). 
IVAN KRASTEV
Chairman, Centre for Liberal Strategies
Bulgaria
Mr. Ivan Krastev is a political scientist and Chairman of the
Board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria.
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In the last decade he has been visiting fellow at
St. Anthony College, Oxford; Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars in Washington; Collegium Budapest,
Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin; Institute of Federalism,
University of Fribourg, Switzerland; Institute for Human
Sciences, Vienna and Remarque Forum, New York. 
Since October 2003 he has been the research director of
the project "Politics of Anti-Americanism in the Beginning
of the 21st Century" coordinated by the Central European
University, Budapest. Since January 2004 Mr. Krastev is the
executive director of the International Commission on the
Balkans. 
Among his latest publications in English are: De-
Balkanizing the Balkans: The State of the Debate; The
Balkans: Democracy Without Choices; Corruption, Anti-
Corruption Sentiments, and the Rule of Law. His paper
"The Anti-American century?" appeared in the April 2004
issue of Journal of Democracy. His book "Shifting
Obsessions. Three Essays on Politics of Anti-corruption."
was published by CEU Press in 2004.
SENIOR STAFF
Sandra Breka 
Ms. Sandra Breka joined the Berlin Office of the Robert
Bosch Stiftung as Program Director in January 2001. Her
portfolio primarily includes international programs focus-
ing on Southeast Europe and transatlantic relations. Ms.
Breka furthermore runs the newly established Bellevue-
Fellowship-Program involving several EU member states.
Prior to joining the Robert Bosch Stiftung, she served as
Program Director for Southeast Europe, transatlantic rela-
tions and security issues at the Aspen Institute Berlin after
a previous assignment with the American Council on
Germany in New York City. Ms. Breka is affiliated with sev-
eral international institutions such as the TRANSFUSE
Association and Women in International Security (WIIS).
After studies in Germany, France and the United States, she
obtained her M.A. at Columbia University in New York. 
Vessela Tcherneva
Ms. Vessela Tcherneva is a Program Director at the Centre
for Liberal Strategies, a Bulgarian think-tank since
November 2003. She manages the Centre's programmes
related to the Balkans and the transatlantic relations, as
well as security-related projects. She is the Managing
Editor of Foreign Policy Bulgaria magazine. Ms. Tcherneva
is a career foreign service officer on sabbatical for the time
of existence of the International Commission on the
Balkans. Her last assignment was at the Bulgarian
Embassy in Washington, DC, where she was the political
officer responsible for political-military and security issues
including NATO enlargement; liaison to the US administra-
tion and NGOs; South Eastern Europe. Ms. Tcherneva
holds a M.A. in Political Science from the University in
Bonn, Germany.
LIST OF EXPERTS
Srdjan Bogosavljevic, Strategic Marketing and Media
Research Institute, Belgrade
Srdjan Darmanovic, CEDEM, Podgorica
Misha Glenny, editor
Damir Grubisa, Department for International Economic
and Political Relations, University of Zagreb
Fabrice de Kerchove, Project Manager, King Baudouin
Foundation
Gerald Knaus, Director, European Stability Initiative
Josip Kregar, School of Law, University of Zagreb
Remzi Lani, Executive Director, Albanian Media Institute
James O'Brien, analyst
Stevo Pendarovski, Head of the Macedonian Electoral
Commission
Jean-Louis Six, Honorary Vice-Chairman, King Baudouin
Foundation, Director, EBRD
Jovan Teokarevic, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade
Walter Veirs, Program Officer, Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation
Ivan Vejvoda, Executive Director, Balkan Trust for
Democracy
Antonina Zheliazkova, Director, International Centre for
Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia
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ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG
The Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH (Robert Bosch Foundation), established in 1964, is one of the largest
German foundations associated with a private company. It embodies the philanthropic endeavors of
founder Robert Bosch (1861-1942) within the structure of the Bosch organization. The Foundation pur-
sues the following purposes: health care, international understanding, social welfare, education, the
arts, culture, the humanities, social and natural sciences. It represents the philanthropic and social
endeavors of founder Robert Bosch 1861-1942) and fulfils his legacy in a contemporary manner in the
flowing program areas:
 Science in Society, Research at Foundation Institutes;
 Health, Humanitarian Aid;
 International Relations;
 Youth, Education and Civil Society.
Its work is organised into five program areas of which two are dedicated to international understand-
ing. The Foundation operates three institutions in Stuttgart: The Robert Bosch Hospital, the Dr.
Margarete Fischer-Bosch Institute for Clinical Pharmacology and the Institute for the History of Medicine.
KING BAUDOUIN FOUNDATION
The King Baudouin Foundation is a public benefit foundation, based in Brussels. It was established in
1976 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the reign of late King Baudouin with the aim of improv-
ing the living conditions of the population. Four main themes are currently central to its work: the 'Social
Justice' programme seeks out new forms of social inequality and supports initiatives to give greater
autonomy to vulnerable people. The 'Civil Society' programme aims to stimulate civic engagement and
strengthen the NGO sector. The 'Governance' programme seeks to involve citizens more closely in the
decision-making that determines how goods and services are produced and consumed, and in develop-
ments in the medical sciences. Through the 'Funds & Contemporary Philanthropy' programme, the
Foundation wishes to encourage modern forms of generosity. The Foundation is active at local, region-
al, federal, European and international level, with a special focus on Southeastern Europe since 1999.
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and
grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the
United States and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transat-
lantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining
ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition,
GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on
both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has five offices in
Europe: Berlin, Paris, Bratislava, Brussels, Belgrade, and Ankara.
CHARLES STEWART MOTT FOUNDATION
The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation is an endowed, nonprofit, private grantmaking foundation based in
Flint, Michigan, U.S.A. Charles Stewart Mott, who was an automotive pioneer in the General Motors
Corporation, established the Foundation in 1926. Through its Civil Society program, the Foundation awards
grants to nonprofit, non-governmental organizations working in Eastern Europe, including South Eastern
Europe, and Russia.  The mission of the Civil Society program is to support efforts to assist in democratic
institution building, strengthen local communities, promote equitable access to resources, and ensure
respect of rights and diversity.  Through the Civil Society program and all of its programs, the Foundation
seeks to fulfill its mission of supporting efforts that promote a just, equitable, and sustainable society.
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